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A Group’s a Group, No Matter How
Small: An Economic Analysis of
Defamation†
Alan D. Miller*
Ronen Perry **
Abstract
Consider the following: A Jews-for-Jesus bulletin reports,
falsely, that a Jewish woman became “a believer in the tenets, the
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.” Does this
publication constitute defamation? Should defamatoriness be
determined in accordance with the views of the general nonJewish community, with those of the Jewish minority, or with a
normative ethical commitment? Our Article aims to provide the
answers.
Part I demonstrates that the definition of defamatoriness in
common law jurisdictions is essentially empirical and
distinguishes between the two leading tests—the English test and
the American test. Part II.A describes the English, or general
community test, whereby a statement is defamatory if considered
so by the “right thinking members of the public at large.” Part II.B
details the American, or sectorial test, whereby a statement is
defamatory if considered so by a substantial and respectable
minority. A third possible empirical test, whereby the defamatory
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comments on earlier drafts.
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potential of a statement may be tested within a small group, has
not been adopted in any jurisdiction.
Part III, however, demonstrates that the small group test is
an economically preferable option to both the English and
American tests. Part III conducts two separate economic analyses
of the alternative empirical tests for defamation. First, we study
the relationship between the view of the community and the views
of the individuals who comprise the community. We show that the
defamation cases should be decided according to the unanimity
rule: A statement may be considered defamatory only when all
individuals in the relevant community consider it so. Because this
rule is implausible except in the case of the small group test, it
suggests that both the English and American tests lack a solid
theoretical foundation. Second, we study the costs and benefits
associated with the various tests and find that the American
sectorial test is no longer optimal. As a result, we argue that it is
preferable to adopt the small group test when deciding cases of
defamation.
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I. Introduction
A Jews for Jesus bulletin publishes a report, falsely implying
that a Jewish woman became “a believer in the tenets, the
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.”1 Does this
publication constitute defamation? What makes a statement
defamatory? Should a statement be deemed defamatory if it
prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of a respectable minority, such
as the American-Jewish community? Should a statement be held
defamatory only if it prejudiced the plaintiff in the eyes of the
average non-Jewish American or the “common mind?”2 Or should
a statement be examined regardless of actual perceptions,
through the prism of a normative ethical commitment? This
Article aims to provide answers to these questions.
The tort of defamation emerged in common law courts in the
sixteenth century and quickly gained in popularity3—so much so
that according to contemporary scholars, “[N]o area of the law
excites more interest, or controversy, than the law of
defamation.”4 In the past fifty years, there has been an explosion
of interest in this area as the result of a set of Supreme Court
decisions that have imposed additional requirements on plaintiffs
to comport with the dictates of the First Amendment.5
1.
2.
3.

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Fla. 2008).
Id. at 1114.
See ROBERT E. KEETON ET AL., TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1145 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that libel developed separately from
slander in the Star Chamber until common law courts assumed jurisdiction over
all tort actions when the Star Chamber was abolished).
4. MARK LUNNEY & KEN OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 704
(4th ed. 2010).
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (refusing to
extend the actual malice standard to private individuals seeking to collect
damages for defamatory falsehoods); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
156 (1967) (determining that a public figure may recover damages for
defamation if the falsehood poses a “substantial danger to reputation” and
arises from the defendant’s “extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (requiring public officials

2272

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2269 (2013)

Unfortunately, as the scholarly debate has shifted to address the
new constitutional requirements (falsity and fault), the longstanding elements of the common law tort of defamation have
been neglected.6 Although our analysis is not entirely
disconnected from the modern changes in defamation law, our
focus is on one of the traditional common law requirements.
The first and primary element of this cause of action is that
the defendant’s statement be defamatory,7 that is, potentially
harmful to the plaintiff’s reputation. A statement is defamatory if
it is “calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing
him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule”8 or, more broadly, if it
“tend[s] to lower the plaintiff in the estimation” of others,9 even if
the statement is not actually believed or if it does not disclose
previously unpublicized information so that no harm is caused.10
who bring a libel action against critics of their official conduct to prove that the
defendant acted with actual malice).
6. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of
Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1996) (“For the past thirty-one years,
scholars have largely neglected some of defamation’s most basic inquiries,
choosing to bask in the ‘sunny warmth of the first amendment’ . . . .” (quoting
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the
Press, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV 793, 793 (1984))).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (listing the elements
required to establish a cause of action for defamation).
8. Parmiter v. Coupland, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 340 (Exch.) 342; 6 M. & W.
105, 108; see also Thornton v. Tel. Media Grp. Ltd., [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414,
[28] (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/
1414.html (quoting Parmiter, 151 Eng. Rep. at 342 as the “classic definition” of
defamatory).
9. Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1237 (H.L.) 1240 (Eng.); see also
Thornton, [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414 [28] (recognizing that Sim broadened the
classic definition of defamation to encompass views beyond a specific person or
class of persons); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (endorsing the
use of community views to determine a statement’s defamatory character);
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13, 44 (recognizing that a defamatory statement
must have a “tendency to harm reputation”).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (1977) (establishing
that a statement’s defamatory character does not depend on the presence of
actual harm, but instead upon the statement’s potential to harm reputation).
There is a difference between determining whether a statement is defamatory,
which does not require harm, and determining whether a cause of action arises,
because some types of defamation are actionable only if harm is established.
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13, 44.
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The inquiry involves two cumulative steps.11 In the interpretive
step, the court must determine exactly what the statement
attributes to the plaintiff.12 In the evaluative step, the court must
determine whether the statement, as properly interpreted and
understood, has the tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.13
This Article focuses on the evaluative component.14 In particular,
we ask a very specific question: should the potential effect on the
plaintiff’s estimation be tested through the eyes of society at large
or through those of a particular segment of the community to
which the plaintiff belongs?15 If the latter, should the law
differentiate between segments based on their size and
importance?16 Of course, this type of inquiry assumes that the
defamatory character of a statement, or “defamatoriness,”17 is
determined by the actual perceptions of people within a legally
relevant group (an empirical test), not through the lens of a
judicial ethical commitment (a normative test).18

11. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 11 (distinguishing the two stages); J.M.
Burchell, The Criteria of Defamation, 91 S. AFR. L.J. 178, 178 (1974) (same).
12. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 11 (describing the main inquiry in the
interpretive stage as “whether the words [used by the defendant] will bear the
‘spin’ that plaintiff is seeking to put on them” (quoting MARC A. FRANKLIN &
DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 200 (5th ed. 1995))).
13. See id. (explaining that the evaluative step considers the community’s
attitudes and beliefs to assess the statement’s tendency to harm).
14. However, our theoretical analysis may have some bearing on the
interpretive step as well because interpretation may raise the question of
“meaning in the eyes of whom?”
15. See Michael J. Tommaney, Community Standards of Defamation, 34
ALB. L. REV. 634, 641 (1970) (“The problem of determining what segment of the
community should be used as the standard for judging whether a
communication is defamatory . . . [has] been vexing to the courts.”).
16. A related question is whether an empirical test should be subject to
external public policy constraints. See Note, Developments in the Law of
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 886–87 (1956) (discussing public policy
constraints on empirical tests).
17. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 9 (referring to whether a statement is
defamatory or not as the “defamatoriness inquiry”).
18. See id. (“[T]he underlying question is whether the defamatoriness
inquiry should focus on actual community values and prejudices or whether, as
it currently does, the inquiry should impose normative restrictions on what
values it will recognize.”).
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The Article discusses these matters from a novel theoretical
perspective. Yet, the theory is not developed in the abstract. We
aspire to settle real and practically significant legal dilemmas.
Our starting point must therefore be doctrinal. We will show that
in Anglo-American caselaw, two empirical tests, subject to some
normative threshold, constitute the dominant competing
standards for defamatoriness. The critical appraisal of these tests
will lead to a constructive proposal. While our arguments are
relevant to all common law jurisdictions and beyond, we focus
primarily on the United States and therefore discuss the relevant
developments in American constitutional law.
Part II systematically analyzes Anglo-American caselaw.19
There is no consensus among common law jurisdictions
concerning the proper test for determining whether a statement
is defamatory.20 It is prudent to maintain, however, that the
American position is somewhat different from the traditional
English one.21 Part II thus distinguishes between the two leading
tests for defamation.22 Subpart A shows that many courts in
England and in the British Commonwealth, broadly defined, have
embraced the notion that the views of the community as a whole
should be considered (hereinafter “the general community
test”).23 Subpart B shows that the leading view in the United
States has been that the defamatory potential may be empirically
tested within a specific group, namely, a substantial and
respectable minority (hereinafter “the sectorial test”).24 A third
19. See infra Part II (incorporating the approaches taken by Irish and
Australian courts into the analysis of American and English case law).
20. Cf. Roy Baker, Defamation and the Moral Community, 13 DEAKIN L.
REV. 1, 4 (2008) (explaining that Australia’s common law offers various tests for
assessing a statement’s defamatory character).
21. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 635 (distinguishing between the
English courts’ focus on the general community to assess a statement’s
defamatory character from the “important and respectable group in the
community” utilized by the U.S. courts).
22. See infra Part II (recognizing that American courts utilized the
traditional English test until the sectorial test arose as the prevailing approach
in the early twentieth century).
23. See infra Part II.A (explaining that, in addition to empirical data, the
general community test utilizes a normative threshold that assesses a
statement’s defamatory character according to prevailing public policy).
24. See infra Part II.B (stating that American courts generally eschew
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possible approach, whereby the defamatory potential of a
statement may be tested within a small group (hereinafter “the
small group test”), has not been adopted in any jurisdiction, and
will not be presented in Part II. We mention it here for two
reasons. First, we wish to provide a fuller picture of the available
alternatives. Each of the three empirical definitions sets a
different size of the minimal group in which the impact of the
statement may be tested, and each can be represented as a point
or a range on a continuum.25 Second, the Article ultimately
advocates the third approach. The fact that it is a neglected and
unexplored alternative highlights this Article’s contribution to
legal theory. Lastly, for the sake of completeness, subpart C
discusses purely normative (non-empirical) tests for defamation,
while recognizing that they are not common.26
Figure 1

Part III provides two economic analyses of the
tests for defamation.27 It first connects the analysis
with a theoretical argument employed in our earlier
the role of community standards in tort and contract

competing
in Part II
papers on
law.28 The

empirical data to establish the viewpoints of the relevant group and instead
favor utilizing common knowledge of the group’s values).
25. Infra Figure 1.
26. See infra Part II.C (distinguishing the purely normative test’s
concentration on subjective ethical principles from the general community and
sectorial tests’ concern for potential harm to the plaintiff’s reputation).
27. See infra Part III (employing the community standards model and the
cost–benefit analysis to demonstrate the theoretical and practical implications
of each test).
28. See generally Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance,
98 IOWA L. REV. 689 (2013) [hereinafter Miller & Perry, Good Faith] (critiquing
the use of community standards to asses good faith performance between
contracting parties); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87
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theoretical argument can be summarized as follows: First,
community standards are derived from individual standards.
Second, the derivation method should (a) respect unanimous
agreements, (b) change with individual beliefs, (c) treat
individuals equally, and (d) not make ex ante distinctions
between potentially defamatory statements. Third, it should
always be possible to make a nondefamatory statement. We then
use a theorem from a branch of economics known as social choice
theory to show that, as a consequence, the community standard
should consider a statement to be defamatory if, and only if, all
individuals in the community consider it so.29 We argue that this
theorem poses a serious problem for the application of community
standards in general. However, in the case of defamation law,
there is an important twist: the problem is much more severe in
the case of the English general community standard than in that
of the American sectorial standard. In fact, if the sectorial
standard is taken to its logical extreme, so that a statement only
need be considered defamatory among a very small (and possibly
singular) group of people, then the problem posed by this theorem
disappears entirely.
Next, Part III offers a cost–benefit analysis of the
alternatives.30 It shows that there are reasons, separate from our
theorem, to prefer the American sectorial test to the English
general community test, as well as to prefer a small group test to
both. A particularly clear example is what we call the strategic
action problem.31 Many individuals value their reputation within
a very small group, such as their work colleagues or relatives, or
among specific individuals, such as their employer or their
N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324 (2012) [hereinafter Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person]
(advancing a reasonable person standard in tort law based upon “normative
ethical commitment[s]” rather than the “empirically observed practice or
profession”).
29. See infra Part III.A (addressing the theoretical problems that arise
from quantitative constraints encompassed within the general community and
sectorial tests).
30. See infra Part III.B (analyzing how different sizes of the relevant
community under each test pose separate practical costs).
31. See infra Part III.B (recognizing that, under the strategic action
problem, the harm to the plaintiff arises from the value placed on the relevant
community rather than the size of such community).
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spouse. A person who wishes to harm one of these individuals
may strategically disseminate a false statement that is
defamatory only within the relevant small group, without fear of
liability under either of the American or English tests. This
problem is more severe under the English test; in that case a
person may strategically disseminate a false, defamatory
statement only within a substantial and respectable minority
without fear of legal consequence.
Despite these difficulties, we do not claim that American
courts should have adopted the small group test. It too, has its
costs: publishers do not always know, and cannot be expected to
know, whether a statement is defamatory within every small
group that exists in a large and heterogeneous society. Liability
in this case could have a chilling effect, leading to a decrease in
the quantity and quality of published material.32 Consequently,
we do not criticize the choice of American courts to adopt the
sectorial test. Admittedly, the sectorial test suffers from both the
possibility of strategic action and the chilling effect. However, the
strategic action problem is much less severe than in the case of
the general community test, and the chilling effect is much less
severe than in the case of the small group test. Within the
constraints of common law defamation, this choice may have
constituted the optimal tradeoff between these two concerns.
American defamation law has changed substantially since
the adoption of the sectorial test. The most important change, for
our purposes, is the fault requirement established in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.33 We argue that Gertz should be interpreted as
allowing liability only if the defendant was aware, or had reason
to be aware, that the statement was defamatory.34 Under this
interpretation, the fault requirement counterbalances the chilling
32. See infra Part III.B (establishing that the chilling effect encompasses
both the risk of defamation liability and the costs required to assess a
statement’s potentially defamatory character).
33. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (“We hold
that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define
for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”).
34. This position is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 580B (1977).
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effect. As a result of this change, the sectorial test is no longer
optimal. We show that it would be preferable to adopt the small
group test because it is consistent with the goals of current
defamation law, it is easier to apply in difficult cases, and it is
economically efficient.
II. The Competing Theories
A. The General Community Test
1. The Principle
According to the first theory of defamation, which we refer to
interchangeably as the general community test or the English
position, a statement is defamatory if considered so by the
general community.35 While this definition is a slight
oversimplification of contemporary legal reality in England, as we
demonstrate below, it captures a significant portion of the
traditional English stance. One of the most renowned
enunciations of the general community test may be found in
Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd.36 The defendant, a chocolate
manufacturer, advertised its products in national newspapers.37
The ad included a caricature showing the plaintiff, a famous
amateur golfer, and his caddie carrying the defendant’s
chocolate.38 The plaintiff brought an action for defamation,
contending that the ad implied that “he had prostituted his
reputation as an amateur golf player for advertising purposes”
and “had been guilty of conduct unworthy of his status as an
amateur golfer.”39 Witnesses for the plaintiff testified that if an
amateur golfer participated in advertising, his reputation as an
amateur would be damaged, and his membership in any
35. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 635 (“The rule in England is that the
communication in question must tend to defame the plaintiff in the eyes of the
general community, . . . rather than in the eyes of any particular segment of the
community.”).
36. [1930] 1 K.B. 467 (Eng.), rev’d, [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L).
37. Id. at 467.
38. Id. at 468.
39. Id. at 468, 479, 483.
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reputable club would be revoked.40 The Court of Appeal of
England established that a statement is not defamatory even if it
affects the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a section of the
community, such as amateur athletes, unless it amounts to
“disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of right thinking
men generally” or “in the eyes of the average right thinking
man.”41
The Tolley doctrine seems to have two components: an
empirical test—focusing on the views of the general community,
and some sort of a normative threshold (“right thinking,”
“reasonable,” etc.). The interplay between the two components
has generated discussion and some controversy in caselaw and
academic literature, but courts still rely, at least de jure, on the
judgments of society at large to determine what constitutes a
defamatory statement. Accordingly, one of England’s leading
treatises on the subject deduced from Tolley that “[t]he views of
the community as a whole must be considered; an imputation of
conduct which is merely distasteful or objectionable according to
the notions of certain people is not defamatory.”42
A relatively recent authority to this effect is Arab News
Network v. Al Khazen,43 which interestingly corresponds with
contemporary events in Syria. The plaintiffs were a television
news company based in London and broadcasting in Arabic
(ANN), and its owner, the nephew of former Syrian president
Hafez al-Assad.44 The defendants were the former editor in chief
and the publisher of a daily newspaper written in Arabic and
published in London.45 An opinion editorial in this newspaper
stated, inter alia, that the first plaintiff, run by the second
40. Id. at 469.
41. Id. at 479; see also Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All Eng. Rep. 1237 (H.L.)
1240 (Eng.) (“[W]ould the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society generally?”).
42. PHILIP LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 23 (8th ed. 1981); see also
Lidsky, supra note 6, at 16 (“British courts . . . [resort to] the general consensus
of society . . . .”).
43. [2001] EWCA (Civ.) 118 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/
cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/118.html.
44. Id. at [2].
45. Id.
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plaintiff, “has taken up a line vis-à-vis peace negotiations [with
Israel] different from the official Syrian line, to say the least;”
additionally, “[the second plaintiff] has always spoken as an
opposition” and “his television station in dealing with Egypt has
sought writers and journalists known for being a minority in
Egyptian political thinking, who call for truce negotiations with
Israel, and make contacts with it” beyond the limits drawn by the
Egyptian government.46 The editorial concluded with the need to
protect the Arab cause from “American and Israeli schemes
contrived together with weak people.”47 The plaintiffs brought an
action for defamation, arguing that they were portrayed as
“willing tools or agents” of Israel and the United States “in their
schemes to undermine the pan-Arab cause.”48 ANN also argued
that its political objectivity and neutrality had been challenged.49
Alleging that a person or a news network supports peace
negotiations between Israel and the Arab world could not be
considered defamatory by the average Briton. The question, then,
was whether a statement could be considered defamatory if it
prejudiced the plaintiff “amongst part of society, such as the Arab
or Arab-speaking community [in England], rather than amongst
society generally.”50 Based on Tolley, the first instance responded
in the negative.51 The Court of Appeal concluded that the
reference to “American and Israeli schemes contrived together
with weak people” did not allude to the plaintiffs, but to the
second plaintiff’s father and his associates,52 and that while the
editorial disapproved of ANN’s presentation of opposition views,
it did not allege lack of impartiality.53 Thus, it was unnecessary
to determine whether the defamatory nature of a statement
should “be judged by the reaction of ordinary reasonable people in
our society as a whole or by that of such people within a
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at [6].
Id.
Id. at [7].
Id. at [7], [17].
Id. at [14].
Id.
Id. at [21]–[23].
Id. at [25]–[27].
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particular community within that society.”54 Nonetheless, the
court opined in obiter that there are considerable difficulties in
departing from the general community test, which had been
endorsed in “a long series of powerful authorities.”55 Thus, Tolley
is still in force in England, at least according to some.56
The general community test is also manifested in other
common law jurisdictions.57 For example, in the Australian case
of Reader’s Digest Services Proprietary Ltd. v Lamb,58 the
defendants published a book chapter implying that the plaintiff,
the editor of The Sun, exploited a personal friend’s tragedy and
trust to secure a sensational story in violation of journalistic
ethical standards.59 Witnesses for the plaintiff addressed the
possible impact of this incident on the plaintiff’s reputation
among journalists.60 The High Court of Australia explained that
in determining whether a statement is defamatory, the court
relies on the standards by which hypothetical referees would
evaluate the character of the imputation.61 These hypothetical
referees “share a moral or social standard . . . [which is] common
to society generally.”62 The court emphasized that the defamatory
nature of a statement “is ascertained by reference to general
community standards, not by reference to sectional attitudes.”63
Moreover, it is for the jury to give effect “to a standard which they
consider to accord with the attitude of society generally.”64 An
54. Id. at [30].
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Thornton v. Tel. Media Grp. Ltd., [2010] EWHC (QB) 1414,
[81], [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1985 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/
cases/EWHC/QB/2010/1414.html (stating that the Tolley definition does not
encompass the threshold of seriousness required to assess a statement’s
defamatory character).
57. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 178, 180, 182–83 (contending that the
“right thinking people generally” test was adopted in South Africa).
58. (1982) 150 CLR 500 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/HCA/1982/4.html.
59. Id. at 502–03.
60. Id. at 504.
61. Id. at 506.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 507.
64. Id. at 506. However, while evidence of the attitude of particular groups
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Australian commentator explained that in establishing which
standards are “common to society generally,” one must “consider
the prevailing values of a geographically determined population,
taking that population as a whole”; in particular, one needs to
look for a consensus, and if none exists, opt for the majority view
or the average viewpoint, both representing the general
community.65 Although this position has not been endorsed by all
Australian courts,66 it is apparently favored by most Australian
judges and lawyers.67
A nineteenth-century Irish case also supports this position.
In Mawe v. Pigott,68 the plaintiff, a parish priest, was attacked in
the defendant’s newspaper for denouncing the “Fenian
conspirators” (supporters of Irish independence), and was
allegedly exposed to hatred and contempt by people who
considered him an informer or an accomplice of the British
prosecution.69 The court assumed that the plaintiff could be
exposed to hatred among such people, but held that “[t]he very
circumstances which will make a person be regarded with
disfavour by the criminal classes will raise his character in the
estimation of right-thinking men. We can only regard the
estimation in which a man is held by society generally.”70
Seemingly, this was a politically colored, over-inclusive
application of the general community test. It is reasonable to
assume that opposing the Irish independence movement could be
seen in a negative light by the general Irish population at that
time.71
of classes is irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose of determining whether
a statement is defamatory, it is relevant for ascertaining harm once a
defamatory statement is proven. Id. at 507–08.
65. Baker, supra note 20, at 7, 8, 10.
66. Infra notes 153–60 and accompanying text.
67. See ROY BAKER, DEFAMATION LAW AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES: ORDINARY
UNREASONABLE PEOPLE 61 (2011) (explaining that Lamb lays down “the more
influential” test); Baker, supra note 20, at 5, 8 (same).
68. [1869] 4 I.R. (Ir.).
69. Id. at 54–55.
70. Id. at 62.
71. See PATRICK STEWARD & BRYAN MCGOVERN, THE FENIANS: IRISH
REBELLION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC WORLD, 1858–1876, at xvi (2013) (discussing
the reasons why the Fenian movement was unable to garner enough support to
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The general community test has been invoked on several
occasions in American caselaw, but as we demonstrate below, it
has not been the dominant test for at least a century.72 First, it
can be found in relatively old cases. For example, the plaintiffs in
Lyman v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co.,73 a husband
and wife, brought an action against the defendant-publisher for
libel after its newspaper printed a story implying that they were
having marital difficulties which would naturally lead to divorce
or legal separation.74 The court opined that the “standing in the
community” of a successfully married couple is higher than that
of a couple whose marriage had failed; this is the rule that
“people in general” apply to the marriages of others.75 Thus,
publishing that a husband and wife ceased to live together in
harmony injured their reputation.76 The relevant position was
that of the public at large. We can speculate, however, that given
the prevailing views in the 1930s, applying a sectorial test in
such a case would have generated the same outcome.
Second, the general community test has been invoked in
more recent cases to refute the assertion that a particular
statement was defamatory per se without precluding
determination that it was defamatory per quod. In Hayes v.
Smith,77 the plaintiff, a high school teacher, alleged that the
defendants told her supervisor, the superintendent, that she was
a homosexual.78 In refusing to classify this statement as slander
per se the court held that “there is no empirical evidence in this
record demonstrating that homosexuals are held by society in
such poor esteem. Indeed, it appears that the community view
toward homosexuals is mixed.”79 Thus, the “plaintiff must prove
establish Irish independence).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 73–83 (demonstrating that the
general community test has been used in a supplemental role by courts, and has
not been relied on as the determinative test).
73. 190 N.E. 542 (Mass. 1934).
74. Id. at 542.
75. Id. at 544.
76. Id.
77. 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. App. 1991).
78. Id. at 1023.
79. Id. at 1025.
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that the statements, in the context in which they were made,
were defamatory [slanderous per quod] and that they in turn
caused her injury.”80 In Stern v. Cosby,81 the court similarly held
that imputing homosexuality was not defamatory per se.82 The
court concluded that the “‘current of contemporary public opinion’
does not support the notion that New Yorkers view gays and
lesbians as shameful or odious,” relying inter alia on opinion polls
whereby a clear majority of New York residents supported samesex marriage, and an even greater majority supported civil
unions.83
Because the general community test is essentially an
empirical one, it is sensitive to time and place. Public opinion
may vary from time to time and across jurisdictions, even within
a specific legal tradition.84 Thus, for example, while calling a man
“Papist” was not deemed defamatory in England at the time of
King James I,85 it was held defamatory during the reign of King
Charles II, following the restoration of the Church of England as
an exclusive national church.86 Likewise, while referring to an
American citizen as a Loyalist shortly after the American
Revolutionary War could be deemed defamatory in the United
States, it was presumably not considered defamatory in England
or in Canada.
One criticism that can be leveled at the general community
test is that even at a certain time and place, “[n]o conduct is
hated by all.”87 As one commentator noted, “a community could
never unanimously agree on the praiseworthiness or the
80. Id. at 1026.
81. 645 F. Supp. 2d 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
82. Id. at 275–76.
83. Id. at 274.
84. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 178 (“[T]he defamatory content of words
may vary with the temper of times and in accordance with the prevailing social
and moral views.”).
85. See Ireland v. Smith, (1611) 123 Eng. Rep. 633 (C.P.) 633 (“[F]or this
word Papist no action will lie.”).
86. See Roe v. Clargis, (1684) 87 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.) 15–17 (stating that
calling someone in a public office a Papist is an actionable offense); Walden v.
Mitchell, (1690) 86 Eng. Rep. 431 (K.B.) 431 (“To call a man a Papist . . . is not
actionable unless spoken of a bishop.”).
87. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
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blameworthiness of any description by which a man might be
characterized.”88 A straightforward response might be that in
applying a general community test, one need not seek consensus
and may be satisfied with a majority or an average person, both
representing the general community in some sense.89 However,
this shift is exactly the one that our theoretical framework
rejects. We will explain why these versions of the general
community test are theoretically unsound in Part III.90 Moreover,
relying on a majority opinion or on the average person to
determine whether a statement is defamatory may be practical
only in relatively homogenous societies, as England once was.91 It
may take the sting out of defamation law in diverse,
multicultural, or immigrant societies—such as that of the United
States. Attributing a certain characteristic or conduct may not
prejudice a person in the eyes of a majority of the general
American population or an average American, but may defame
him or her among members of a relevant segment of society.92
2. The Qualitative Qualification
The traditional English test, which relies on empirical
observations, at least de jure, consists of a normative constraint.
A statement is defamatory if considered so by the general
88. Note, With How Many People Must a Writing Have a Tendency to
Disgrace the Plaintiff to Be Actionable, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 44, 46 (1909)
[hereinafter Disgracing the Plaintiff].
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing a majoritarian
approach to the general community test in which the average person would be
the standard for the community).
90. See infra Part III.A.1 (determining the empirical results from the
general community test are negative and that this negativity outweighs the
unanimity the general community test provides).
91. See David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair
Comment II, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1282, 1300–01 (1942) (discussing homogeneity
in England); Burchell, supra note 11, at 184 (explaining that the general
community test fits England, where the population is relatively homogeneous).
92. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 8, 41, 43, 49 (comparing homogenous and
heterogeneous societies, arguing that the homogenous community is a myth);
Burchell, supra note 11, at 184 (arguing that heterogeneity in South Africa calls
for replacing the general community test with a sectorial test).

2286

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2269 (2013)

community, taking into account the views of “right thinking”
people. While it is possible to treat “right thinking” as
synonymous with “ordinary” or “average,” adding no normative
dimension to the empirical test,93 this is not the dominant
interpretation of this term. “Right thinking” is considered the
opposite of “wrong thinking,” that is, ethically constrained.94 Put
differently, the fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in
the eyes of the general community is important but inconclusive.
The court will pay no heed to a community standard if it does not
comply with the normative threshold.
But how should this threshold be defined? On the one hand,
the normative constraint must be a limited one because
subjecting the empirical component to an all-pervasive and highly
demanding ethical commitment might practically nullify the
former. Consequently, it may leave real and substantial harm to
one’s reputation without redress.95 On the other hand, excluding
only the judgments of the depraved and the lunatic might take
the sting out of the normative constraint. Thus, in practice,
courts rarely override the community standard, and when they do
so it is usually because the commonly held view seems clearly
contrary to public policy.96
Overriding an empirical conclusion on the basis of public
policy seems more likely under the American sectorial test
discussed below because it should be easier for a court to reject
the views of eccentric minorities than to reject commonly held
views. Yet one can imagine cases in which a court concludes that
the general community standard is so morally unacceptable that
it should be disregarded. Racial prejudice may serve as a good
example. Whereas associating a person with a racial minority
93. This was apparently the case in South Africa in the 1970s. See
Burchell, supra note 11, at 180, 182 (discussing the fact that in South Africa
during the 1970s, right thinking was synonymous with average, or ordinary).
94. Id. at 180–81.
95. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22–23, 39 (discussing the informant case
and explaining that harm exists).
96. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text (describing cases in
which the Georgia Court of Appeals ignored the community standards of racial
segregation and white supremacy in favor of public policies supporting
desegregation and racial homogeneity).
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would not be deemed defamatory by the general community
today, the social and political climate was quite different not long
ago. In the early twentieth century, referring to a Caucasian
individual as a “negro” was held defamatory in several
jurisdictions. In May v. Shreveport Traction Co.,97 the plaintiff, a
Caucasian woman, was classified as a “negro” by the streetcar
conductor and sent to the seats reserved for “negro passengers.”98
The plaintiff contended that she was humiliated, and the court
concluded, relying on prevailing “social habits, customs, and
prejudices,” that “to charge a white person, in this part of the
world, with being a negro, is an insult, which must, of necessity,
humiliate, and may materially injure, the person to whom the
charge is applied.”99
Later on, courts began to challenge the defamatory nature of
statements concerning race. To the extent that this was done
while racial segregation was still the social norm, the conceptual
tool was reference to public policy.100 Consider Watkins v.
Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co.,101 decided by the Court of
Appeals of Georgia in 1934. The defendant’s newspaper published
an article stating that the plaintiff, a candidate for the office of
97. 53 So. 671 (La. 1910).
98. Id. at 672, 674.
99. Id. at 674; see also Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71, 71 (La. 1888)
(“Under the social habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in Louisiana, it
cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being a negro is calculated
to inflict injury and damage.”); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 639
(S.C. 1905) (“To call a white man a negro, affects the social status of the white
man so referred to.”); Bowen v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 564, 566 (S.C. 1957)
(“[T]o publish in a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro . . . in view
of the social habits and customs deep-rooted in this State, such publication is
calculated to affect her standing in society and to injure her in the estimation of
her friends and acquaintances.”); Haven Ward, “I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”: Should
Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual Be Defamatory?, 44 GA. L. REV. 739,
749–50 (2010) (“[I]t was defamatory as a matter of law to misidentify a white
person as black.”). But see Williams v. Riddle, 140 S.W. 661, 664–65 (Ky. 1911)
(finding that referring to a white person as a negro is not actionable per se, and
that in the absence of a special damage caused by the statement there is no
cause of action at all).
100. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 181 (stating that if prevailing views
change, the community standard changes, and there is no need to resort to
public policy to overcome racial perception).
101. 174 S.E. 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934).
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sheriff of the municipal court of Augusta, was endorsed by the
African-American community in the city.102 Allegedly, this was a
death blow to his candidacy in a society that adhered to “white
supremacy.”103 Still, the court was unwilling to find defamatory
the statement that a candidate was endorsed by a particular
racial group.104 It explained that “[n]o man is worthy of holding
office in this or any other state who does not purpose in his heart
to deal fairly and justly with all men, irrespective of race, color, or
creed. All right thinking men covet the good will and esteem of all
men.”105 In Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc.,106 the plaintiff
brought an action for defamation against a newspaper that
published an obituary notice erroneously stating that she was
deceased.107 Also, while the plaintiff was white, the obituary
listed a funeral home primarily serving black people.108 The court
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Palmore v. Sidoti,109
opining that while racial and ethnic prejudices still exist in
practice, the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.110
We emphasize that as common perceptions about race change,
resorting to public policy is no longer necessary to preclude
actions for defamation based on false imputation of race.
In a similar manner, a court may decide that homophobes
are not right-thinking persons for the purposes of defamation
law, even if homophobia is a prevalent social norm, “on the basis
that disparagement of homosexuals has no sound moral
foundation.”111 In the past, courts commonly held that false
102. Id. at 200.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 201.
105. Id.
106. 379 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
107. Id. at 552.
108. Id. at 553.
109. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
110. Id. at 433; see also Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 252, 261–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on Palmore to the same effect);
Burchell, supra note 11, at 181 (explaining that while calling a white person
“Hottentot” was empirically defaming, the right-thinking person is free from
racial prejudice and would not consider it defamatory).
111. Baker, supra note 20, at 12; see also Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence
Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation
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imputation of homosexuality was defamatory per se. Many now
reject this view on the basis of either actual changes in social
attitudes or public policy, although they still allow actions for
defamation per quod.112 Consider Yonaty v. Mincolla,113 in which
the defendant, through a third-party defendant, told the
plaintiff’s girlfriend that he was gay, thereby causing “the
deterioration and ultimate termination of [their] relationship.”114
While the court found that statements falsely imputing
homosexuality were previously held defamatory per se based on
community standards,115 it opined that these decisions were
inconsistent with current public policy.116 The prior cases hinged
on the flawed premise that it was shameful and disgraceful to be
described as gay.117 Yet, “[g]iven this state’s well-defined public
Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 138–40 (2012), www.yale
lawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1112.pdf (arguing that such claims must be denied);
Ward, supra note 99, at 742 (“Courts should not give effect to homophobia by
holding such statements defamatory because it sanctions and endorses
homophobic views.”); id. at 743 (“In the case of misidentification of someone as
homosexual, public policy considerations outweigh the potential harm to the
plaintiff of not allowing recovery because courts should not sanction or endorse
homophobia.”); id. at 760–65 (positing that allowing claims validates and
legitimizes homophobic views and contravenes public policy against
discrimination, despite empirical support).
112. See Ward, supra note 99, at 752–58 (discussing the fact that courts are
split as to whether falsely labeling someone as homosexual is defamatory per se
or per quod, but that courts are united in the belief that calling someone
homosexual is defamatory); see also Abigail A. Rury, Note, He’s So Gay . . . Not
That There’s Anything Wrong with That: Using a Community Standard to
Homogenize the Measure of Reputational Damage in Homosexual Defamation
Cases, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 655, 656–57 (2011) (discussing the fact that
courts have shifted from holding that the false identification of someone as
homosexual is per se defamation to holding that such identification is at most
per quod defamation).
113. 945 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
114. Id. at 776.
115. See, e.g., Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, 585
F. Supp. 2d 520, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[H]omophobia is sufficiently widespread
and deeply held that an imputation of homosexuality can—at least when
directed to a man married to a woman—be deemed every bit as offensive as
imputing unchastity to a woman.” (footnote omitted)).
116. See Yonaty, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (“[T]hese Appellate Division decisions
are inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be followed.”).
117. See id. (“[T]he prior cases categorizing statements that falsely impute
homosexuality as defamatory per se are based upon the flawed premise that it is

2290

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2269 (2013)

policy of protection and respect for the civil rights of people who
are lesbian, gay or bisexual, we now overrule our prior case to the
contrary and hold that such statements are not defamatory per
se.”118 In other words, public policy may trump the public
perception. The court added, however, that there has been a
“tremendous
evolution
in
social
attitudes
regarding
homosexuality”119 and a corresponding legal change; thus, “it
cannot be said that current public opinion supports a rule that
would equate statements imputing homosexuality with
accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations that an
individual has a loathsome disease.”120 Here too, as common
perceptions change, resort to public policy is no longer necessary
to make attribution of homosexuality nondefamatory.
B. Substantial and Respectable Minority
1. The Principle
In the early twentieth century, American courts deviated
from the traditional English test.121 In Peck v. Tribune Co.,122 the
defendant newspaper published an advertisement in which the
plaintiff’s picture was presented as that of Mrs. Schuman, a
nurse recommending a certain brand of whiskey for its healthenhancing properties.123 Alas, the plaintiff was not Mrs.
shameful and disgraceful to be described as lesbian, gay or bisexual.”).
118. Id. at 776.
119 Id. at 778.
120. Id. at 779.
121. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the traditional English test as a
general community test).
122. 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
123. See id. at 188
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, and, so far as is material, is as follows:
“Nurse and Patients Praise Duffy’s. Mrs. A. Schuman, One of
Chicago’s Most Capable and Experienced Nurses, Pays an Eloquent
Tribute to the Great Invigorating, Life-Giving, and Curative
Properties of Duffy’s Pure Malt Whisky.” Then followed a portrait of
the plaintiff, with the words, “Mrs. A. Schuman,” under it. Then, in
quotation marks, “After years of constant use of your Pure Malt
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Schuman, was not a nurse, and abstained from distilled alcoholic
beverages.124 Assuming that the advertisement could be perceived
as attributing the recommendation to the plaintiff, the question
was whether such publication was defamatory.125 The Circuit
Court of Appeals held that it was not because there was no
“general consensus of opinion” that drinking whiskey was wrong
or that being a nurse was discreditable, and because participating
in advertising might be ridiculed by only a few.126 In overruling
this decision, Justice Holmes opined that “[i]f the advertisement
obviously would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an
important and respectable part of the community, liability is not
a question of a majority vote.”127 A statement can constitute
defamation if it is “known by a large number, and . . . lead[s] an
appreciable fraction of that number to regard the plaintiff with
contempt.”128 Justice Holmes added that a doctor represented in
advertising might have a cause of action if the representation
affects his or her reputation among doctors, even if the public at
large does not consider it detrimental.129 In other words, there is
no need for a consensus or even a majority opinion to establish
defamation. The test is that of a “considerable and respectable
Whisky, both by myself and as given to patients in my capacity as
nurse, I have no hesitation in recommending it as the very best tonic
and stimulant for all local and run-down conditions,” etc., etc., with
the words, “Mrs. A. Schuman, 1576 Mozart St., Chicago, Ill.,” at the
end, not in quotation marks, but conveying the notion of a signature,
or at least that the words were hers.
124. See id. (“The declaration alleged that the plaintiff was not Mrs.
Schuman, was not a nurse, and was a total abstainer from whisky and all
spirituous liquors.”).
125. See id. at 189 (“The question, then, is whether the publication was a
libel.”).
126. See id. (“[T]here was no general consensus of opinion that to drink
whisky is wrong, or that to be a nurse is discreditable . . . . [A] certificate and
the use of one’s portrait in aid of an advertisement would be regarded with
irony, or a stronger feeling, only by a few.”).
127. Id. at 190.
128. Id.
129. See id. (“Thus, if a doctor were represented as advertising, the fact that
it would affect his standing with other of his profession might make the
representation actionable, although advertising is not reputed dishonest, and
even seems to be regarded by many with pride.” (citations omitted)).
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class in the community.”130 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
endorsed this position, reiterating that there is no need for a
consensus or a majority opinion and that a statement is
defamatory if it might prejudice the person “in the eyes of a
substantial and respectable minority.”131
A substantial and respectable minority can be defined in two
primary ways—in sociological terms, as a class or a sector, or in
numerical terms, as a portion of the general public. Thus, for
example, in Peck v. Tribune Co., a sociological definition could
have been people of the plaintiff’s congregation, and a numerical
definition could have been ten percent of the population of
Illinois. We will now demonstrate that the sociological–sectorial
test is the dominant one in American caselaw. Religious
denominations, professional circles, and distinct cultural
communities are often used as reference points.
An example for the application of the sectorial test to a
particular religious faith is Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp,132 which
opened this Article.133 The plaintiff-respondent, a Jewish woman,
contended that the defendant-petitioner published a report
falsely implying that she became “a believer in the tenets, the
actions, and the philosophy of Jews for Jesus.”134 She argued,
inter alia, that the publication constituted defamation.135 The

130. Id.; see also Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., 907 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D.
Vt. 1993)
A communication is defamatory “if it tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him” . . . . For the
purposes of this definition, the community may be a substantial
respectable group, even though only a minority of the total
community.
(citations omitted).
131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“A
communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes
of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, nor even in the eyes of a
majority.”).
132. 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008).
133. Supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
134. Jews for Jesus, 997 So. 2d at 1100–01 (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 1101 (“Rapp’s complaint alleged: (1) false light invasion of
privacy; (2) defamation; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).
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trial court dismissed her complaint.136 The District Court of
Appeal of Florida affirmed, finding that “the ‘common mind’
reading the newsletter would not have found [the plaintiff] to be
an object of ‘hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt or disgrace.’”137
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the District Court of
Appeal’s decision, holding that “a communication can be
considered defamatory if it ‘prejudices’ the plaintiff in the eyes of
a ‘substantial and respectable minority of the community.’”138 The
statement need not be construed as defamatory “by the
community at large.”139 It may be reasonably assumed that the
court contemplated the possible impact of attributing a belief in
Jesus to a member of the Jewish community, given that such
attribution could not prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of the
Christian majority.
An example for the application of the sectorial test to a
particular profession is Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc.140
The plaintiff-architect entered into a contract to design a housing
project for the defendant-developer.141 Alas, the defendant named
another partnership as the project architects in its promotional
brochure, contrary to the plaintiff’s representations to his
business associates.142 The architect and his architecture firm
“alleged damage to their professional reputation among the real
estate development and architectural community in which they
work[ed].”143 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
explained that the characterization of a statement as defamatory
is a question of fact, not of law.144 It held that to be actionable, a
136. See id. (“The trial court dismissed [Rapp’s] final complaint in its
entirety with prejudice.”).
137. Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
138. Jews for Jesus Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100, 1114–15 (Fla. 2008).
139. Id. at 1115.
140. 310 N.E.2d 343 (Mass. 1974).
141. See id. at 344 (“In 1972 the corporate plaintiff entered into a contract
with a development corporation to design, as the architect, a project known as
‘Madison Park Houses.’”).
142. Id. at 344–45.
143. Id. at 346.
144. See id. at 345 (“It is now well settled that the character of a publication
as being [libelous] or otherwise is not to be judged by what we ourselves would
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statement “need not hold a plaintiff up to ridicule or damage his
reputation in the community at large, or among all reasonable
men. It is enough that they do so among ‘a considerable and
respectable class’ of people.”145 In particular, a statement clearly
deemed defamatory among the professional community to which
the plaintiff belongs should not fail to be actionable merely
because it is not considered so by “the general public.”146
An interesting example for the application of the sectorial
test to a distinct cultural community is Reiman v. Pacific
Development Society.147 A local newspaper in the Finnish
language published an article accusing the plaintiff, a member of
the Finnish community in Oregon, of trying to disrupt labor
organizations to the advantage of capitalists.148 The court found
for the plaintiff,149 even though this publication could affect his
reputation only within the Finnish community.150 This decision is
used by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as an illustration for
an application of the sectorial test.151
The sectorial test has been endorsed by jurists in other
common law jurisdictions. For example, both Peck and the
Restatement are cited with approval in a well-known Canadian
tort law treatise,152 admittedly without any independent
Canadian support. The sectorial test was also adopted by the
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hepburn v. TCN Channel
Nine Pty. Ltd.153 The question arose in regard to whether it was
defamatory to accuse a medical practitioner of conducting lawful
abortions.154 Justice Glass held, first, that the test must be of an
understand it to mean, but that commonly the question is one of fact . . . .”
(quoting King v. Ne. Publ’g Co., 2 N.E. 486, 486–87 (Mass. 1936))).
145. Id. at 346 (citations omitted).
146. Id.
147. 284 P. 575 (Or. 1930).
148. Id. at 578.
149. Id. at 579.
150. Id. at 576.
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (discussing
cases that illustrate comment e and listing Reiman as an illustrative case).
152. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 688 nn.49–50 (7th ed. 2001).
153. [1983] 2 NSWLR 682 (Austl.).
154. See id. at 693 (“Much of the argument on appeal was devoted to
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empirical nature.155 After contrasting the English and
American positions,156 he opined that “a man can justly
complain that words, which lower him in the estimation of an
appreciable and reputable section of the community, were
published to members of it, even though those same words
might exalt him to the level of a hero in other quarters.”157
Thus, Justice Glass adopted the American approach.158
Interestingly, this seems like a numerical version of the
sectorial test, as the judge does not refer to the views of a
specific sector, but rather refers to those of a certain portion of
the general population that does not constitute a majority. It is
unclear whether the Australian High Court’s decision in
Reader’s Digest overrides the New South Wales Court of
Appeal’s decision in Hepburn.159 Some commentators prefer
imputation (c) viz that the plaintiff was an abortionist.”).
155. See id. at 693–94 (“[R]egard should be paid to actual community
standards, right or wrong.”).
156. See id. at 693
There is a body of English authority which suggests that the standard
of opinion is that of “right thinking people generally” . . . . In the
United States, on the other hand, an imputation can be defamatory if
it injures a man in the eyes of a “considerable and respectable class in
the community” though it be only a minority.
(citations omitted).
157. Id. at 694.
158. See BAKER, supra note 67, at 60 (“[A]ccording to Hepburn the test is
whether it might lead to damage to reputation among an ‘appreciable’ or,
according to Hutley JA, ‘substantial’ section of the community, which
presumably can include a minority. Cleary Hepburn is presenting a sectionalist
test.”); LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 121 (2007) (“The
court effectively adopted the American approach.”); Baker, supra note 20, at 7–8
(“Now the question is not what most people think, but what do some people
think? . . . [U]nder Hepburn the community of ‘ordinary reasonable people’ is
less homogenous in its responses to the imputation, with large proportions of its
members holding diametrically opposed views.”).
159. See BAKER, supra note 67, at 60–61
In terms of hierarchy of precedent, Reader’s Digest was a decision of
the High Court of Australia, while Hepburn was determined by the
Court of Appeal of New South Wales. A decision of a higher court
should override a contrary dictum from a lower. On the other hand,
the dictum quoted from Reader’s Digest could be regarded as obiter on
this issue . . . . On that basis, Reader’s Digest would, as an authority,
be persuasive at best, and would not bind future courts.
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Hepburn, explaining that it better fits the cultural diversity in
Australia.160
We should note here that despite the empirical pretense,
American courts rarely use or seek empirical data concerning
actual views and perceptions.161 They sometimes do,162 but in
practice, many decisions hinge on an intuitive judgment, that
is, “common knowledge” and common sense regarding the
relevant community’s values.163 Some scholars encourage
greater reliance on concrete evidence of actual perceptions of
the relevant sector, such as polls and surveys.164
2. The Quantitative Qualification
Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
a statement can be defamatory if it prejudices a person in the

(footnote omitted).
160. See MCNAMARA, supra note 158, at 122 (“The decision in Hepburn was
appropriate . . . . The general standard of Readers’ Digest v. Lamb should be
reconsidered by Australian courts, especially given the cultural diversity that
characterizes Australian society and many local communities.”).
161. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 18 (“[I]t is important to note that courts
rarely resort to polls or surveys to ascertain the attitudes of the ‘respectable
part’ of the community.” (footnote omitted)).
162. See, e.g., Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“[A]ccording to a recent opinion poll from Quinnipiac University—New York
State residents support gay marriage 51 to 41 percent, with 8 percent
undecided.” (citation omitted)).
163. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 18–19 (“The determination of who
constitutes a substantial and respectable minority often hinges on what the
judge presumes the community’s values are.”).
164. See id. at 47 (“[R]equiring . . . poll and survey results would add
another layer of complexity to the already tangled web of defamation law.
Nonetheless, the benefits of such a proposal in making defamation an effective
instrument for redressing harm to reputation probably justify imposing this
additional burden.” (footnote omitted)); Riesman, supra note 91, at 1307–08
(“The use of these public opinion techniques would tend to avoid the subjective
factors in the experience of the actual plaintiff, or of the court and jury.”); Rury,
supra note 112, at 680 (“[T]he courts should articulate their findings by citing
trends in legislation, public polls, or rely on expert testimony. Requiring the
courts to identify the relevant community removes any implicit or explicit
biases, and provides an articulable basis on which future courts may rely.”).
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eyes of a minority,165 that minority must be substantial.166
According to the Restatement, a single individual or a very small
group of persons with peculiar views will not suffice.167 The
courts’ thorny task, therefore, is to ascertain a very elusive border
line.168 We are told that a single individual cannot constitute a
substantial minority, but it is unclear when a group becomes
sufficiently large for purposes of the sectorial test, a problem
reminiscent of the sorites paradox.169 If a group of n members is
sufficiently large, then a group of n-1 members cannot be
insufficiently large because a single person does not make a real
difference. But if this holds, then a group of n-2 members should
also be sufficiently large, and so should a group of n-3 members,
and so on and so forth. Ultimately, we get to the conclusion that a
group of one member is also sufficiently large, contradicting our
initial assumption. Setting the boundary is inherently arbitrary,
but legally inevitable.
For example, we have seen that jeopardizing a person’s
reputation among American Jews might be deemed
defamatory.170 The Jewish population is a sufficiently large
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“A
communication to be defamatory need not tend to prejudice the other in the eyes
of everyone in the community or of all of his associates, not even in the eyes of a
majority of them.”).
166. See id. (“It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice
him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority of them . . . .”).
167. See id. (“On the other hand, it is not enough that the communication
would be derogatory in the view of a single individual or a very small group of
persons, if the group is not large enough to constitute a substantial minority.”);
accord WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 577 (2d ed. 1955)
(“But if the group who will think the worse of the plaintiff is so small as to be
negligible, or one whose standards are so clearly anti-social that the court may
not properly consider them, no defamation will be found.” (footnotes omitted)).
168. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that courts have
struggled to decide what part of the community is the standard for determining
defamation).
169. See Dominic Hyde, Sorites Paradox, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 1, 1 (Edward Nalta ed., 2011), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/sorites-paradox/ (“The sorites paradox is the name given to a class of
paradoxical arguments, also known as little-by-little arguments, which arise as
a result of the indeterminacy surrounding limits of application of the predicates
involved.”).
170. See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text (describing the facts,
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minority for purposes of the sectorial test.171 Yet, within the
Jewish population one might observe highly varied nuances.172
Although a statement may in fact defame a person within a small
fragment of a given minority, it will not be deemed defamatory
from a legal standpoint.173 The case of Weiner v. Time & Life
Inc.174 is illustrative, even if one may contest the outcome. A Time
magazine article on anti-Semitic incidents near Yeshiva
University in upper Manhattan ascribed the following quotation
to the plaintiff, an orthodox Jewish rabbi: “I no longer wear my
yarmulke [skullcap] when I’m out driving. Now I look over my
shoulder to see who’s following me.”175 The plaintiff argued that
he had never made this statement, and that its publication
damaged his reputation as an observant Jew in his highly
orthodox Jewish community.176
procedural history, and holding in the Jews for Jesus case).
171. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
tbl. 77 (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ tables/12s0077.pdf
(showing that over 6.5 million Jews made up 2.1% of the U.S. population in
2010).
172. See Jonathon Ament, American Jewish Religious Denominations,
UNITED JEWISH COMMUNITIES REPORT ON THE NATIONAL JEWISH POPULATION
SURVEY 2000–01, Feb. 2005, at 8, http://www.jewishfederations.org/local_
includes/downloads/7579.pdf
[T]he denominational choices of American Jews reveal an extremely
diverse population. While most Jews still identify with a particular
denomination, an increasing proportion of Jews appear to be opting
out of a denominational framework, choosing instead to call
themselves “just Jewish” or some variant of secular. No single
category, denominational or not, garners the support of even 40% of
all Jews.
173. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (identifying an individual or
a very small group of individuals as insufficient according to the Restatement).
174. 507 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
175. Id. at 784.
176. See id. at 784–85
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the extrinsic facts that he is an Orthodox
Jew and a Rabbi and that he never told the Time reporter that he
removed his yarmulke, since to do so totally conflicts with plaintiff’s
religious beliefs and observances and that the statement attributed to
him that he removed his yarmulke when driving damaged his
reputation by causing his neighbors, friends, religious associates and
acquaintances to suspect and believe that he is a person of immoral
and reprehensible character guilty of violating Orthodox Jewish Law.
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The court opined that a publication is actionable if it “tends
to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion . . . in the
minds of a substantial number of the community”177 or “tends to
make him be shunned or avoided, or deprived of the friendly
association of a considerable number of respectable members of
the community although it imputes no moral turpitude to him.”178
The court then held that considering the small highly orthodox
Jewish community in upper Manhattan to be the relevant
community would be an overly restrictive view.179 In the court’s
opinion, it would be unfair and unworkable to expect a national
magazine with a heterogeneous audience to consider “each small
enclave within various communities whenever it writes about a
person.”180 A statement is not defamatory if deemed so only by
those with “eccentric perceptions or preconceptions.”181 The court
further explained that “[a] publication designed to reach a
national audience cannot be judged by the standards of a unique
and fractional segment of its total readership . . . . [T]he impact of
an alleged libel cannot fairly be judged if we attempt to slice the
community pie too thin.”182 Presumably, if the views of a larger
and less eccentric segment were at stake, as in the case of Rapp,
the court could find them relevant. Critics may argue that the
highly orthodox Jewish population in New York is sufficiently
large for purposes of the sectorial test,183 but this position only
challenges the specific outcome and not the quantitative
qualification.

177. Id. at 785 (quoting Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100 (1947)).
178. Id. (quoting Brown v. Du Frey, 1 N.Y.2d 190, 196 (1956)).
179. See id. (“Plaintiff seeks to equate the word ‘community’ as tantamount
to the small, highly Orthodox Jewish community in upper Manhattan with
which he associates. This is too restrictive . . . .”).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Joseph Berger, Aided by Orthodox, City’s Jewish Population Is
Growing Again, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/
12/nyregion/new-yorks-jewish-population-is-growing-again.html?_r=0
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2013) (stating that “the Jewish population of New York City is
growing again, increasing to nearly 1.1 million”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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A somewhat more esoteric example is Fairley v. Peekskill
Star Corp.,184 in which an article published in the defendant’s
newspaper stated that the plaintiff, a self-proclaimed social
theoretician, planner, and developer, described himself as a social
scientist.185 Although we are still uncertain as to which people
might consider this inaccuracy defamatory, the group is
presumably small and eccentric.186 Thus, the court held that
“[a]mong certain segments of the population a social scientist
designation might be considered unflattering. [But] the
peculiarities of taste found in eccentric groups cannot form a
basis for a finding of libelous inferences.”187
The quantitative qualification has three intuitive
explanations. First, as the court in Weiner observed, reputational
harm among members of a very small group may not be
reasonably foreseeable by the publisher.188 Avoiding such harm
might impose an excessive burden, mostly in the form of high
information costs, on publishers.189 Second, the size requirement
ensures that “the injury to reputation is not de minimis.”190 A de
minimis qualification generally aims to prevent a legal process
where the administrative costs outweigh the benefits (in terms of
deterrence or even justice).191 The problem with this explanation
184. 445 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
185. Id. at 157–58.
186. See id. at 158 (noting that while certain segments of the population
may consider the term to be defamatory, the opinion of these “eccentric” groups
cannot form a basis for defamation). But see Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22
(recognizing that a large percentage of the population feels contempt for
informers, as indicated by substantial evidence) (citing John Irwin & Donald R.
Cressey, Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed., 1970)).
187. Fairley, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
188. See Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (noting that it would be “manifestly unfair and unworkable” for every
publisher to consider every possible community when writing an article).
189. Id.
190. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 19 (“[T]he quantitative requirement of a
‘substantial’ minority appears to be an attempt to ensure that the injury to
reputation is not de minimis.” (citing Daniel More, Informers Defamation and
Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 517 (1989))).
191. See id. (explaining that the “substantial minority” size requirement
attempts to “ensure that the defamatoriness inquiry does not devolve into a
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is that if a single individual or a very small group of people who
find the statement defamatory are the plaintiff’s close relatives or
employer, the plaintiff will receive no recovery despite the
substantial nature of his injury. What matters to the plaintiff is
not the number of people who may think less of him, but rather
the magnitude of the statement’s effect on each of them.192 Third,
the quantitative qualification may prevent a proliferation of
actions, many of which are frivolous.193 This is exceptionally
important in the context of defamation because many lawsuits
mean a greater encroachment on freedom of expression.194
3. The Qualitative Qualification
As explained above, both the English and the American
empirical tests consist of a normative constraint.195 In England, a
statement is defamatory if considered so by the general
community, taking into account the views of “right-thinking”
people.196 In the United States, a statement may be defamatory if
considered so by a mere minority, provided that it is a
“respectable” one.197 While the two concepts—“right-thinking”
search for the few idiosyncratic individuals who would think less of the plaintiff
for conduct that the overwhelming majority would find laudatory”).
192. Id. at 19–20 (discussing the significance of an individual’s reputation
among small groups in society); see also id. at 42 (same).
193. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 186 (arguing that requiring the injury to
reputation to be noticed among a “substantial and respectable” portion of the
community prevents “a proliferation of defamation actions” in certain situations,
such as when the feelings of a single family unit have been offended).
194. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (concluding
that attacking publishers restricts the freedoms of speech and press and leads to
intolerable levels of self-censorship); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279–80 (1964) (opining that forcing critics of official conduct to guarantee the
accuracy of their factual assertions leads to self-censorship).
195. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the normative constraint of the
English test); supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text (noting that American
judges rarely use empirical data and often use intuition and common sense to
determine the values of the community).
196. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 180 (discussing the creation of the
“right-thinking” test); supra Part II.A (explaining the general community test in
detail).
197. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (finding that the
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and “respectable”—do not necessarily have an identical
meaning,198 they serve a similar purpose: normative screening.
The fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in the eyes of a
substantial minority is inconclusive.199 The court will reject the
sectorial standard if it does not comply with the normative
threshold.200 An American commentator summarized the
applicable principle as follows: “Where the group under
consideration approves of illegal or antisocial acts, or the
nonfeasance of judicially approved acts, the courts have refused
to recognize as legally damaging the factual injury caused by the
false utterance.”201 In rejecting the sectorial test for public policy
reasons, the court practically reverts to general community
standards, and sets the limits of variance, diversity, and
tolerance within the community.202 Critics say that this
qualification leaves real reputational harm without redress, and
without changing the deviant minority’s perceptions.203

publication was defamatory because it hurt the plaintiff’s reputation within an
important and respectable section of the community); Lidsky, supra note 6, at
29 (discussing the value of a community’s reputation when an individual within
the community attempts to proceed on libel charges). But see Kimmerle v. N.Y.
Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933) (explaining that
“widespread notoriety” is insufficient and that the statement must tend to affect
the plaintiff’s reputation “in the minds of right-thinking persons”).
198. See Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 140 A.2d 529, 531 (N.J.
1958) (“[U]nder the prevailing American rule, the court is not concerned . . .
with whether the segment of the public which thinks odiously of plaintiff
because of the facts stated in the publication is ‘right-thinking’ . . . . It is
sufficient that it be ‘substantial’ and ‘respectable.’”).
199. A similar discussion has surrounded the English test. See supra Part
II.A.2 (“[T]he fact that a person’s reputation may be injured in the eyes of the
general community is important, but inconclusive. The court will pay no heed to
a community standard if it does not comply with the normative threshold.”).
200. Supra Part II.A.2.
201. Note, The Community Segment in Defamation Actions: A Dissenting
Essay, 58 YALE L.J. 1387, 1391 (1949).
202. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 40 (“[B]y defining the values of a particular
group within the community as too antisocial to be recognized, [courts] are
‘declaring how much variability and diversity can be tolerated within the
group.’” (quoting KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF DEVIANCE 11 (1966))).
203. See id. at 39 (discussing the role of the court to provide redress for the
victim’s injury and to redefine the values and prejudices of the community).
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A recurring example is the informant case, which may be
generalized as the assistance-to-law-enforcement case. In
Connelly v. McKay,204 a truck service station owner was accused
by the defendant of informing the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) about truck drivers who had violated ICC
rules and regulations.205 He argued that this had affected his
reputation among truck drivers and had harmed his business.206
The court concluded that while accusing a person of being an
informer might affect a person’s reputation among law violators,
it cannot be deemed defamatory.207 The court cited the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, whereby “[t]he fact that a
communication tends to prejudice another in the eyes of even a
substantial group is not enough if the group is one whose
standards are so antisocial that it is not proper for the courts to
recognize them.”208 The legal system cannot consider cooperation
with law enforcement agencies as negative conduct, even if
people in some circles evidently consider it so.209 Thus,
attributing such conduct to a person cannot underlie an action
for defamation.210
Connelly was followed in many subsequent cases.211 For
instance, in Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY-TV (Channel
12),212 the plaintiff-inmate was falsely presented in the
defendant’s broadcast as an FBI informant.213 Relying on
204. 28 N.Y.S.2d 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
205. Id. at 328.
206. Id. at 328–29.
207. See id. at 329 (finding that informers may not be held in “high esteem”
but the label does not constitute defamation).
208. Id. at 329 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e
(1977)).
209. See id. (noting that to hold in favor of an antisocial group would
“penalize the law-abiding citizen and give comfort to the law violator”).
210. See id. at 329–30 (concluding that words not creating a generally
unflattering or immoral image fail to satisfy a defamation claim (citing Hallock
v. Miller, 2 Barb. 630, 632 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848))).
211. See, e.g., Rose v. Borenstein, 119 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289–90 (N.Y. City Ct.
1953) (finding Connelly to be “a case precisely in point” and supportive of the
decision that accusations of informing on others fails to qualify as defamation).
212. 382 A.2d 257 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978).
213. Id. at 258.
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Connelly, the court found that the statement was not
defamatory.214 It emphasized that while the allegation that an
inmate is an informer might impair his reputation among fellow
inmates, the tort of defamation is not designed to protect one’s
reputation among members of a limited community whose views
“depart substantially from those prevailing generally.”215 This
formulation is somewhat different from that of Connelly, insofar
as it does not focus on the antisocial nature of the standard, but
instead on the magnitude of the deviation from the views of the
general public. Theoretically, very eccentric but harmless views
might be disregarded under Saunders, but not under Connelly.
Although the public policy constraint is needed to exclude
liability in the informer’s case under the American test, given the
attitude toward informers among offenders, it may be redundant
under the English test for an almost obvious reason: helping law
enforcement agencies might be seen in a negative light in some
circles, but not by the law-abiding public at large.216 Therefore,
attributing such help may be considered defamatory under an
empirical sectorial test, but not under a general community test.
Indeed, English courts have treated cases of this kind somewhat
differently. In Byrne v. Deane,217 the plaintiff was publicly
identified as the person who informed the police of the presence of
illegal gambling machines at a golf club, thereby denying fellow
members the ability to gamble.218 The Court of Appeal denied his
claim for defamation.219 Lord Justice Slesser opined that “to
allege of a man . . . that he has reported certain acts, wrongful in
law, to the police, cannot possibly be said to be defamatory of him
in the minds of the general public.”220 The test is that of the
214. Id. at 259.
215. See id. (noting that the tort of defamation will not protect the
reputations of those individuals whose attitudes and social values depart
substantially from the values of the greater community).
216. But see Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (recognizing that a large portion of
the general population feels contempt for informers (citing John Irwin & Donald
R. Cressy, Thieves, Convicts and the Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed., 1970))).
217. [1937] 1 K.B. 818 (C.A.) (Eng.).
218. Id. at 818.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 832–33.
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“ordinary good and worthy subject of the King,” and such a
subject would not consider the allegation that a certain person
helped law enforcement against wrongdoers to be defamatory.221
We nonetheless need to qualify this analysis, as some empirical
evidence shows that a significant portion of the general
population also despises informers.222 Thus, even the general
community test may be ultimately imbued with normative
content when applied to informant cases.
C. The Purely Normative Test
The defamatory nature of a particular statement is generally
determined by an empirical test, be it a general community
standard or a sectorial standard.223 While the two are qualified to
some extent by a normative constraint, the essence of the inquiry
remains mostly empirical. However, the defamatory nature of
statements can also be tested from a purely normative
perspective. Put differently, courts can determine that a
particular statement is defamatory because it violates a
normative ethical principle applicable to human interaction,
regardless of the potential impact of the statement on the
subject’s reputation.224 In so doing, courts will aim to prevent
morally unacceptable publications, thereby imposing their own
moral preferences on human communications.225 Again, purely
221. Id. The same conclusion was reached in South Africa. See Burchell,
supra note 11, at 182, 195 (discussing a case where in which a student was
allegedly helping the police to obtain evidence against fellow students at the
university).
222. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (discussing how the court in Saunders
ignored the views of the larger community, which evidence suggests disfavor the
informer (citing John Irwin & Donald R. Cressey, Thieves, Convicts and the
Inmate Culture, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SUBCULTURES 64, 67 (David O. Arnold ed.,
1970))).
223. See supra Part II.B (discussing the “substantial and respectable
minority,” or sectorial, test).
224. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining that a court may sacrifice
the individual plaintiff in an attempt to advance certain social policy goals).
225. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing ways in which public policy and
morality may overrule a morally repugnant community opinion); see also Baker,
supra note 20, at 12 (noting that “moralist courts” may subjectively decide who
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normative tests are not common in Anglo-American
jurisdictions.226 Still, the alternative must be mentioned not only
for the sake of analytical completeness, but also because our
previous studies indicate that applying a normative test may
sometimes be inevitable given the theoretical unsoundness of
empirical community standards.227
Applying a normative test raises at least three concerns.
First, on the conceptual level, defamation law protects a
relational interest, namely a person’s reputation.228 Reputation
may be defined as the estimation of a person by other members of
the relevant community.229 Thus, defamation law does not protect
a person’s good name in the abstract, but the positive opinion
that others have of the individual: “It is the actual community
attitudes and opinions . . . which must serve as the standard,
regardless of whether the court itself considers the particular
group to be ‘right-thinking.’”230 Second, defamation law
encroaches upon the freedom of speech.231 Imposing a limit
falls within the category of “ordinary reasonable people”).
226. See supra Part II.A–B (explaining the normative and empirical
constraints within the English and American tests).
227. Infra Part III.A.
228. See Burchell, supra note 11, at 183 (“Reputation is a relational
interest . . . .” (citing G.L. Fricke, The Criterion of Defamation, 32 AUSTRALIAN
L.J. 7, 8 (1958))); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of
the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983) (explaining that
defamation “remedies a wrongful disruption in the ‘relational interest.’”) (citing
L. GREEN, CASES ON INJURIES TO RELATIONS 193–276 (1940)); Arthur L. Berney,
Libel and the First Amendment—A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV.
1, 40–41 (1965); Leon Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35, 36 (1936)).
229. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 12–13 (“Defamation, therefore, is a
‘recipient-centered concept’ whose focus is on the views or opinions of others and
their behavior in responding to the defamatory statement . . . Harm to
reputation is thus a socially constructed injury, an injury defined by the
response of others . . . .” (citing Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The
Plaintiff’s Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsoty, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825, 828 (1984); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986))).
230. Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (citing G.L. Fricke, The Criterion of
Defamation, 32 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 7, 10 (1958)).
231. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 3 (“[S]cholars and judges have come to view
defamation as a contest between the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of
speech and the tort’s protection of reputation.”) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)).
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derived from actual perceptions of the community may be deemed
more legitimate than imposing a limit based on the judge’s
subjective views.232 Third, once the court opts for a normative
test, it must determine the content of this test, which is not an
easy task.233 A theory of permissible and impermissible
expression is markedly different from a theory of permissible and
impermissible conduct, so one cannot simply import the familiar
tests for reasonableness in negligence law and plug them into the
defamation law.234 One commentator suggested that an allusion
to reasonableness may denote that a defendant is liable only if he
or she can foresee that the statement will prejudice the
plaintiff.235 However, we doubt that foreseeability alone can make
a statement wrongful and provide a sufficient ground for liability.
To be employed, a purely normative test must be justified, and
the more esoteric or elitist the test, the greater the departure
from prevailing views.236

232. See generally id. at 18–19 (noting that the “community segment
determination” is often based on the judge’s own knowledge, beliefs, and
experiences, rather than on the community’s beliefs (citing Daniel More,
Informers Defamation and Public Policy, 19 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 503, 513
(1989))).
233. Cf. Rudolf Alexander Mikus, The Reasonable Person in Substantive
Canadian Criminal Law (Aug. 1995) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, The University
of
British
Columbia),
https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/
3900/ubc_1995-0450.pdf? (“Even if most people in a given society would agree
that certain conduct was done ‘wickedly,’ the criteria for wickedness are not
transparent . . . . Therefore, a purely normative test does not work without
restricting criteria, but the very criteria are not visible.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
234. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 328, 348, 361–
63 (defining the various normative tests for reasonableness).
235. Baker, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining the view that the defendant
should only be liable for interpretations of his or her publication by the
reasonable person, as those are the interpretations that the defendant should
have anticipated).
236. Cf. supra Part II.B.3 (noting that the decision in Byrne v. Deane was
contrary to empirical data regarding the community’s view and therefore may
need more analytical qualification).
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III. Redefining Defamation
A. Social Choice Theory
1. The Model of Community Standards

In this Part, we analyze the leading empirical tests for
defamation—the general community test and the sectorial test—
with the aid of an economic model of community standards.237 In
the model, which we have previously introduced in the contexts of
negligence238 and good faith performance,239 community
standards are methodically derived from the views of the
individuals.240 We use the model to determine which derivation
methods are plausible and to understand the relevant
implications for the law of defamation.
The model of community standards is drawn from the field of
social choice theory, a branch of economics that arose in the
1950s out of the pioneering work of Kenneth J. Arrow.241 Arrow
sought to understand the origins of the economic concept of social
welfare—the good of the society—and asked the following
question: with which methods can we plausibly derive the social
welfare from the welfare of the individuals who comprise the
237. For the formal presentation of the model, see Alan D. Miller,
Community Standards, 148 J. ECON. THEORY 2696, 2697 (2013); Alan D. Miller,
Essays on Law and Economics 38 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, California Institute of Technology), http://thesis.library.cal
tech.edu/2283/1/Miller_Dissertation.pdf [hereinafter Miller, Essays] (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). The model was originally applied to
community standards in the context of obscenity law. Id.
238. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 376–84
(detailing a formal model of the reasonable person).
239. Miller & Perry, Good Faith, supra note 28, at 730–32 (explaining a
formal community standards model used to apply the duty of good faith
performance).
240. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 377
(“Contemporary community standards . . . are often said to be an aggregate of
the standards of individuals.” (citing United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369, 370
(9th Cir. 1975))).
241. See id. at 373 (“[Arrow’s theorem] launched a new field of research in
economics, social choice theory.”). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (providing a more detailed
explanation of Arrow’s pioneering theory).
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society?242 Arrow sought to define “plausible” by requiring that
the derivation method satisfy several axioms or properties.243 One
axiom required that the society should strictly prefer one
alternative to another when every individual strictly preferred
the former to the latter.244 Another required that opinions about
“irrelevant” alternatives should not affect society’s ranking of the
relevant alternatives.245 A third required that society should not
consider the opinion of one person—a dictator—to the exclusion of
all others.246 Arrow showed through the use of an innovative
mathematical theorem that no derivation method could possibly
satisfy his axioms.247 There is no good way to define social
welfare.
Arrow’s result shocked the world of economics. The entire
field of welfare economics, necessary for making policy
recommendations, depended on the existence of a means of
calculating social welfare.248 While all of the major methods were
known to have problems, economists had assumed that these
problems were not insurmountable and that a reasonable
definition could be discovered over time.249 Arrow showed that
242. See ARROW, supra note 241, at 2 (considering the possibility of creating
a “procedure for passing a set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social
decision-making”); see also Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at
327 (“Arrow studied social welfare as a positive concept, in which the well-being
of society derives from individual preferences.”).
243. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (providing
a description of these axioms).
244. See ARROW, supra note 241, at 25–26 (describing the positive
correlation between social values and individual values).
245. See id. at 26–28 (describing the condition of the independence of
irrelevant alternatives).
246. See id. at 30–31 (describing the condition of non-dictatorship).
247. See id. at 12–13 (describing the mathematical theorem); see also Miller
& Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (discussing the results and
impact of Arrow’s research).
248. See Patrick Suppes, The Pre-History of Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice
and Individual Values, 25 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE. 319, 319 (2005) (“To most
early writers . . . utility had been a quantity theoretically measurable; that is to
say, a quantity which would be measurable if we had enough facts.”).
249. See id. (noting that most early writers believed utility could be
measured if enough information was provided); see also Miller & Perry,
Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 373 (“[Arrow’s theorem] cast doubt on the
fundamental assumptions of welfare economics . . . .”).
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there was a reason for the problems encountered by welfare
economists: finding a defensible method is not merely difficult, it
is impossible. For this discovery, Arrow was awarded the Nobel
Prize in 1972.250
The common law elements of the tort of defamation have
something in common with the economic concept of social
welfare.251 First, the empirical question of whether the statement
has a tendency to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the eyes
of the community or a segment of it, which underlies the
dominant standards for the determination of defamation,252 is
analogous to the concept of social welfare in the sense that both
depend on the beliefs, broadly understood, of a group of people—
the society.253 Second, both the economic definition of social
welfare and the legal definition of defamation have been
controversial. Still, the problems are by no means identical.
Defamation is distinct from welfare. For this reason, our model of
defamation, which is based on judgments, is very different from
Arrow’s model of welfare, which was based on preferences. That
there is no good way to combine preferences does not mean that it
is impossible to define the standard for defamation.
We apply a different argument from social choice—one
constructed with legal standards in mind—to the problem of
defamation. We begin by describing the model of community
standards as applied to the general community test. The
250. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, (Oct. 25,
1972), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/
1972/press.html (“As perhaps the most important of Arrow's many contributions
to welfare theory appears his ‘possibility theorem,’ according to which it is
impossible to construct a social welfare function out of individual preference
functions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. See, e.g., Talbert v. United States, 932 F.2d 1064, 1066 (1991) (noting
that the elements of the tort of defamation include a false and defamatory
statement, an unprivileged publication, fault on the part of the publisher, and
“either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the
existence of special harm caused by the publication” (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977))).
252. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the two dominant standards for the
determination of defamation).
253. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 377 (noting
that social welfare is an aggregate of individual welfare, based on informal
observations of the individuals’ behaviors).
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application of the model to the sectorial test will be illustrated
after presentation of the main results. The model can be
described as follows.
First, there is a group of individuals. In the case of the
general community test, this is a “geographically determined
population.”254 Next, let us ask the question of whether the
statement tends to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the
eyes of an individual. The answer to this question depends on the
individual: a statement may lower the estimation of the plaintiff
in the eyes of some individuals, but not others.255 In order to
consider this problem, it will help if we begin by labeling an
individual’s beliefs on this subject. We will simply call these “the
individual’s beliefs about reputation.”
Of course, whether a specific statement concerning one
individual is defamatory in the eyes of another may depend on
the context.256 Consider, for example, a false statement that the
plaintiff aided the British during the Battle of the Brandywine in
1777. Would this statement tend to harm the plaintiff’s
reputation in the eyes of a particular individual in Philadelphia
during that time? In general, the answer might be yes, but if the
plaintiff was known to be a supporter of George III, the answer
may be no. The effect that a statement may have on the plaintiff’s
reputation depends on what is already known about the
plaintiff.257 Thus, an individual’s beliefs about reputation can be
described as the collection of statements that would tend to lower
the plaintiff in the eyes of that individual given the context. We
allow all possible beliefs, with but one restriction: regardless of
the context, it must always be possible to make a nondefamatory
statement about the plaintiff. That is, it should not be the case
that every statement that one could possibly make about the
254. Baker, supra note 20, at 7.
255. See id. at 16–20 (describing the results of a study about reactions to
defamatory speech among Australian adults).
256. See Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Colo. App. 1991) (discussing
the role that context plays in the court’s analysis of defamatory statements).
257. See Jews for Jesus v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (2008) (concerning
the allegedly defamatory statement that the plaintiff had joined “Jews for
Jesus”—a statement that could injure the plaintiff’s reputation only if a
substantial and respectable minority knew that she was Jewish).
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plaintiff would tend to harm his or her reputation. Of course,
individuals do not tend to think about reputation in this way.
Some people may rely on “gut instincts” or upon a particular
normative philosophy. However, this distinction is largely
immaterial. Because we consider all possible statements and all
relevant contexts, our model provides a complete description of an
individual’s beliefs about reputation.258
Having formulated a model of individual beliefs about
reputation, we then complete the model by describing the
community’s belief about reputation. As with individual beliefs,
the community belief is the collection of statements that tend to
lower the plaintiff in the eyes of the community given the context,
with the sole restriction being that it must always be possible to
make a nondefamatory statement about the plaintiff. The
community belief is methodically derived from individual beliefs;
that is, it is completely determined by individual beliefs and the
derivation method.259
Having described a complete model of the general community
test, we now study derivation methods. These are the essence of
the definition of defamation—they specify how the community
belief is defined with respect to the individuals’ beliefs.260 In
particular, we look for natural axioms or properties that we
would expect a derivation method to satisfy.261 We impose four
such axioms.
To understand the first axiom, consider a society with no
disagreement—a world in which every individual agrees with
every other individual about every possible statement in every
relevant context.262 This society might be an incredibly boring
258. We make an implicit assumption that two beliefs are identical if they
would always agree about whether a statement is defamatory.
259. See Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at 6 (“These individual standards
are then aggregated to form a community standard.”).
260. See Miller & Perry, Good Faith, supra note 28, at 732 (describing the
application of derivation methods in determining community).
261. See Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at 9 (“Social rules are studied
through an axiomatic approach . . . .”).
262. See id. at 41 (“The first axiom, homogeneity, requires that if there is a
single standard shared by every member of the community, then that standard
is also the community standard.”).
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place in which to live, but it would be easy to determine whether
a statement is defamatory in this community. Our first axiom,
“homogeneity,” requires that in this special case, the community
belief must be identical to the commonly held individual belief.
Axiom 1: Homogeneity. If all individuals have identical beliefs
about reputation, then the community belief is identical to the
commonly held belief. 263
To explain the second axiom, we must first describe a natural
way of comparing individual beliefs. We say that Amy is more
“judgmental” than Bill if whenever a statement tends to harm the
plaintiff’s reputation in Bill’s eyes, that statement also tends to
harm the plaintiff’s reputation in Amy’s eyes. Along these lines,
Amy can become more judgmental if she changes her mind and
decides that, in some context, a statement that previously did not
affect her view of the plaintiff now does in fact lower the plaintiff
in her estimation. According to our second axiom,
“responsiveness,” the community belief should respond to changes
in individual beliefs: if all individuals become more judgmental,
or do not change, then the community standard should also
become more judgmental, or remain static.264 This can be thought
of as a direction requirement: the community belief should
change in the same direction as individual beliefs.
Axiom 2: Responsiveness. If all individuals’ beliefs either
(a) become more judgmental or (b) do not change, then the
community belief either becomes more judgmental or does not
change.265
The next axiom stems from the notion that the law should
treat all individuals equally.266 Amy’s belief is accorded neither
more nor less respect than Bill’s belief. There are different ways
of implementing this ideal in practice. We use the idea of a swap
263. Id.
264. See id. (“The second axiom, responsiveness, requires the community
standard to ‘respond’ in the same direction (more permissive or less) as the
community.”).
265. See id. (“If every individual standard becomes more permissive, then
the community standard should become more permissive as well.”).
266. See id. (“[T]he law requires equal treatment of individuals.”).
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of beliefs. Amy and Bill swap their beliefs if Amy’s new belief is
identical to Bill’s old belief, and Bill’s new belief is identical to
Amy’s old belief. In this case, the names attached to the beliefs
have changed, but the collection of beliefs found within the
society has not.267 Our third axiom, “anonymity,” requires the
community belief to be invariant to a swap of beliefs.
Axiom 3: Anonymity. A swap of individual beliefs does not affect
the community belief.268
The last axiom is based on the idea that the community belief
should be based entirely on individual beliefs rather than on
some preconceived notion of what is defamatory.269 If it is
defamatory to label someone a “communist” but not defamatory
to label that person a “fascist,” this must be because of a
distinction made by the individuals and not because the
distinction is built into the derivation method itself. Our fourth
axiom, “neutrality,” requires that the derivation method must not
favor some beliefs over others.270
Axiom 4: Neutrality. The derivation method should be neutral
between beliefs.271
Homogeneity, responsiveness, anonymity, and neutrality are
basic properties that any reasonable method of deriving the
community belief should satisfy.272 Which derivation method
satisfies these four basic properties? One such method is what we
call the unanimity rule. Under this method, a statement made in
a particular context is defamatory if, and only if, it would tend to
lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of every single
267. See id. (“The third axiom, anonymity, requires that the aggregation rule
not discriminate between individuals.”).
268. See id. at 10 (“An anonymity axiom requires that the qualification of
individuals does not depend on their names.”).
269. See id. at 41 (“This axiom assumes that all judgments are subjective
and is relevant when there is no method by which works can be objectively
compared.”).
270. See id. (“The fourth axiom, neutrality, requires that the aggregation
rule not discriminate, ex ante, between works.”).
271. Id.
272. See id. (“Each [axiom] is, in some way, a desirable property for any
objective aggregation rule.”).
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individual in the community.273 We do not claim that the
unanimity rule is a good way to determine whether a statement
is defamatory. Instead, we claim something else—not only does
the unanimity rule satisfy the four axioms, but the unanimity
rule is the only method to do so. Every other method of deriving a
community belief fails in at least one of these four respects.274
The theorem states that only the unanimity rule satisfies the
four axioms. Why are all other rules flawed? A few methods, such
as the majority rule, are invalid rules in our framework.275 It is
possible that, for some context, every possible statement that
could be made about a plaintiff would be found defamatory; this
contradicts our assumption that it be possible to make a
nondefamatory statement regardless of the context. This problem
is illustrated in Figure 2. In the figure, each circle illustrates the
set of statements that a particular person considers
nondefamatory in a particular context. One can readily see that
no statement is considered nondefamatory by a majority.
Figure 2

273. See id. at 45 (“Under the ‘unanimity rule’, a work is considered obscene
if it is considered obscene by every individual.”).
274. For the formal proof of this claim, see Miller, Essays, supra note 237, at
45. Informal explanations of the proof are provided in Miller & Perry,
Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 384, and in Miller & Perry, Good Faith,
supra note 28, at 740–44.
275. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 388
(discussing the flaws of the majority rule and why the unanimity rule is better
for determining community beliefs).
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There are variants of the majority rule that do not suffer from
this problem. However, they violate one or more of the four
axioms. For example, consider the majority–unanimity rule,
under which a statement is deemed defamatory in a given context
if the majority considers it so—unless every statement is
considered defamatory in that context by some majority. In the
case where every statement is considered defamatory by some
majority, the majority–unanimity rule deems a statement
defamatory only when everyone agrees that it is defamatory.
Unlike the majority rule, the majority–unanimity rule is a valid
rule; it cannot lead to the outcome in which all statements are
defamatory. Still, it violates the responsiveness axiom: it is
possible that every individual in the community will become less
judgmental and that the community will become more
judgmental as a consequence.
We will now demonstrate that every valid rule other than the
unanimity rule violates one or more of the four axioms. While the
proof applies for any number of individuals and any number of
contexts, to simplify the exposition, we will focus on the case of
three people and a single context. At the outset, we consider two
special cases. While each of these scenarios may be unlikely to
occur in practice, they are helpful because they are very simple
and can be used as reference points.
The first such special case is that of complete agreement:
every person in the society shares an identical belief about every
statement in every context. This case is represented in Figure 3,
in which the shaded circle represents the set of statements
considered nondefamatory in the context. Because the three
circles are identical, they overlap, so only one circle is shown. In
this case, because of the homogeneity axiom, it is clear that the
community will consider a statement nondefamatory if and only if
it is within the circle.
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Figure 3

From this special case, we can show that if a statement is
considered defamatory by everyone, then the community must
also consider it defamatory. To see that this is the case, consider
the set of views represented in Figure 4, and focus on a particular
statement, S, considered defamatory by everyone. Next, suppose
that everyone becomes less judgmental, so that everyone
considers a statement nondefamatory if it is within the dotted
line. We are now in the special case described in Figure 3.
Because the opinions depicted in Figure 4 are more judgmental
than those depicted in Figure 3, every statement deemed
defamatory in the latter case must also have been deemed
defamatory in the former. Statement S was defamatory in the
case of Figure 3—because it is outside the circle—and
consequently must be defamatory in the case of Figure 4. This
proves that the community must consider a statement
defamatory if an individual within the community considers it
defamatory.
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Figure 4

The second special case is that of complete disagreement:
every person considers some statements to be nondefamatory in
the context, but no two people agree that any particular
statement is nondefamatory. Furthermore, each person believes
that the same proportion of statements is nondefamatory. This
case is depicted in Figure 2, in which each of the circles—each
depicting the set of statements that a particular individual
considers nondefamatory—is of the same size, and no two circles
overlap. Because this case is completely symmetric, the
anonymity and neutrality axioms imply that every statement
considered nondefamatory by someone must be treated in the
same manner—either none may be defamatory or all must be.
However, if all statements in the circles are defamatory, then
every statement would be defamatory in this context, and this
violates the assumption that some statements must be
nondefamatory. Thus, in this special case, a statement is
nondefamatory if, and only if, one individual considers it
nondefamatory.
It remains to be shown that, in general, a statement must be
deemed nondefamatory whenever one or more people consider it
nondefamatory. We begin with the general case, depicted in
Figure 5. To prove this claim, we must show that statement T—
considered nondefamatory by one person—must be considered
nondefamatory by the community. We make the following two
observations about Figure 5. First, each individual is less
judgmental in Figure 5 than that individual was in Figure 2. As a
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consequence, the responsiveness axiom implies that any
statement that is nondefamatory in Figure 2 must also be
nondefamatory in Figure 5. Second, statement T is considered
nondefamatory by the same individual in both cases. Because
statement T is within one of the circles in Figure 2, we can
conclude that it must have been deemed nondefamatory by the
community in that case. By the responsiveness axiom, then,
statement T must also have been nondefamatory in the case of
Figure 5.
Figure 5

We have shown that any statement that is considered
defamatory by all individuals must be deemed defamatory by the
community, and that every statement considered nondefamatory
by at least one individual must be deemed nondefamatory. This is
precisely the unanimity rule.276 Thus, we have concluded our
proof.
2. A Critical Appraisal of the Empirical Tests
The implication of the result in subpart A for the general
community test is clearly negative. If it is true, as some
commentators have claimed, that “no conduct is hated by all,”277
276. See Miller & Perry, Reasonable Person, supra note 28, at 388
(discussing and defining the unanimity rule).
277. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909).
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or that “a community could never unanimously agree on the
praiseworthiness or the blameworthiness of any description by
which a man might be characterized,”278 then the unanimity rule
would completely eviscerate the law of defamation. For any
context, it would be practically impossible to find a statement
that tended “to lower the plaintiff in the estimation” of every
single individual in a particular jurisdiction.279 Communities are
simply too diverse to meet this exacting standard. Proponents of
the general community test, of course, have never defended the
unanimity rule. Rather, they look to majoritarian norms or to the
average person standard.280 However, our framework rejects both
of these approaches.
To apply the model to the sectorial test, we simply need to
make one change—specifically to the first element of the model,
the “group of people” from whose beliefs we derive the community
belief. In the case of the general community test, this was
determined to be the set of people living in a particular
jurisdiction.281 In the case of a sectorial test, it will be a smaller
group of people; it may be the community of amateur athletes,282
doctors,283 Jews,284 Arabic speakers,285 truck drivers,286 or any
278. Note, Disgracing the Plaintiff, supra note 88, at 46.
279. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 285 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(citing Afro-Am. Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
280. See Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479 (C.A.) (Eng.)
(“Words . . . must tend to disparage him in the eyes of the average sensible
citizen.”), rev’d [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.).
281. See Baker, supra note 20, at 23 (discussing how juries are made up of
the general community of the jurisdiction).
282. See, e.g., Tolley, [1930] 1 K.B. at 472–74 (discussing the plaintiff’s
status as an amateur golfer and the role it played in determining defamation).
283. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (discussing
doctors).
284. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1114–15 (Fla.
2008) (discussing the applicable community standard can be a minority view
and in this case, the Jewish community).
285. See, e.g., Arab News Network v. Al Khazen, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 118,
[14] (Eng.) (“[W]hether one can have regard to a lowering of reputation amongst
part of society, such as the Arab or Arab-speaking community, rather than
amongst society generally.”).
286. See, e.g., Connelly v. McKay, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328–29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1941) (discussing the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant’s words affected
the plaintiff’s business from truck drivers).
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other group that might be considered a substantial and
respectable minority. The precise rule used to determine the
membership of this group need not concern us at this point.
Having made this simple change, the rest of the model
applies in a straightforward way. The unanimity rule is still the
unique rule that satisfies the axioms; however, it must be applied
to the sector and not to the community as a whole. Thus we must
ask, for example, whether a statement in a specific context would
tend to lower the estimation of the plaintiff in the eyes of truck
drivers. The sectorial test is likely to produce many of the same
problems as the general community test. For example, while the
majority of amateur athletes in 1930 might have considered it
wrong to commercially exploit their fame,287 surely one or two
might have seen nothing wrong with the practice. Similarly,
while many Arabic speakers may have supported the Syrian
government’s official policy toward Israel,288 it is quite clear that
some Arabic speakers support negotiation toward an eventual
peace settlement.
While the sectorial test is likely to lead to many of the same
problems as the general community test, it is clear that the main
problem is attenuated, at least in a theoretical sense: the smaller
the group, the larger the likelihood that all members of the group
will consider a particular statement to have been defamatory.
The extent of the attenuation of this problem depends on the
minimal allowable size of the sector whose views the courts will
consider relevant. For a substantial and respectable minority,
this difference may not matter much. It will still be difficult to
find many statements about which all members of the minority
agree. However, as the size of the sector is allowed to become
smaller, the probability of unanimous agreement increases.
Smaller groups may be more cohesive, and unanimous opinions
may be more likely to appear. In the extreme case, where each
individual is a separate sector, this problem disappears entirely.
287. See Tolley v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 467 (C.A.) (Eng.)
(“[H]e had prostituted his reputation as an amateur golf-player for advertising
purposes.”), rev’d [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.).
288. See Arab News Network, [2001] EWCA at [4–7] (discussing the News
Network’s publication, which described the reasons for the Vice President’s
dismissal).
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B. Cost–Benefit Analysis

The Impact of Group Size. In this subpart, we analyze and
compare three different rules: (1) the English general
community test, under which a statement is defamatory if
considered so by the general community;289 (2) the American
sectorial test, under which a statement is defamatory if
considered so by a substantial and respectable minority;290 and
(3) the small group test, under which a statement is defamatory
if considered so by a small group or a single individual.291
Because it is unclear which method courts use to determine
the community belief—or even whether an empirical test is in
fact used as is claimed—we need to make an assumption about
how a change in the allowable size of a group affects courts’
behavior. We assume that the scope of liability for defamation
widens as the minimal size of the allowable group becomes
smaller. This is so because in allowing claims of defamation
based on smaller groups, we add to and do not preclude claims
for defamation within larger groups. For example, in
jurisdictions using the sectorial test, one may make a claim of
defamation based on the views of the general community, and
need not focus on the case of a specific “substantial and
respectable minority.”292
The Strategic Action Problem. There are reasons, separate
from the theoretical problem outlined in subpart A, to prefer the
American sectorial test to the English general community test
and to prefer a small group test to both. The sectorial test does
not allow claims that would be permitted under the small group
test, and the general community test bars claims allowed by

289. See Lidsky, supra note 6, at 16 (“British courts took the position that a
statement must be defamatory according to the general consensus of
society . . . .”).
290. See id. (“American courts . . . discern the relevant community in whose
eyes the plaintiff was injured.” (citation omitted)).
291. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a
person’s reputation when he is defamed in the eyes of an extremely small
group . . . .”).
292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
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both.293 The cost of not allowing these claims can be
significant.294
First, it is important to recognize that the harm to the
plaintiff may be largely independent of the size of the relevant
group. Individuals who are not public figures usually care about
their reputations among relatively small groups.295 On a personal
level, they care most about their reputation among friends,
family, neighbors, and people who attend the same church or
whose children attend the same schools.296 On a professional
level, they may care about their reputation among colleagues,
and their ability to retain their job, find a new one, or attract
clients. A statement that is defamatory among a small group may
be just as harmful as one that is defamatory among the general
population.
Second, if the statement in question is not found to be
defamatory because either the sectorial test or the general
community test is used, then the defendant has no incentive to
take the proper amount of care to prevent real and serious harm
to the plaintiff’s reputation. This is especially clear when the
publisher of the statement knows, or could discover at a low cost,
that the statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation in the
relevant group. In this case, a publisher will not exert a
reasonable level of effort to ensure that the defamatory statement

293. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the differences between successful
claims under the sectorial test and the general community test).
294. See supra Part I (discussing the possibility of strategic action and the
chilling effect of the sectorial test and the general community test); see also
Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a person’s
reputation when he is defamed in the eyes of an extremely small group, or even
in the eyes of only one person . . . .”).
295. See Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986) (“[I]t is obvious that a person can only be injured in his community, i.e.
with those who know him personally or by reputation . . . .”); Tommaney, supra
note 15, at 641 (“[M]ore harm can be done to a person’s reputation when he is
defamed in the eyes of an extremely small group, or even in the eyes of only one
person . . . . For example, if a man is defamed in the eyes of his employer, his
relatives, or his close friends, considerable damage may be done . . . .”).
296. See Tommaney, supra note 15, at 641 (explaining how people value the
opinions of certain people more than others depending on the relationship).
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is truthful or to check, when reasonable, whether the statement
might be harmful to the plaintiff’s reputation.297
Third, this problem becomes more extreme when considering
the case of intentional defamation. Individuals may strategically
make a false statement with the goal of inflicting injury to the
reputation of another, having an economic or a psychological
motivation. The harm from this malicious behavior can be
significant. A carefully calculated statement may only harm the
plaintiff’s reputation within a small group of individuals, yet
might destroy the plaintiff’s marriage or career. The problem is
not simply that the plaintiff may not recover, but rather that the
defendant has a blank check to harm the reputation of a
perceived rival, so long as the defendant can find a statement
that is only harmful within a subset of the plaintiff’s immediate
circle of family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. Put
differently, individuals have no incentive to take precautions
when they know that a statement tends to harm the potential
plaintiff’s reputation within a group that is smaller than the
minimum recognized by the applicable test. In this case, a
strategic defamer can act with impunity.
While the problems of negligent and intentional defamation
are distinct, in general it is clear that they exist in close
proximity to each other. That is, neither is a serious problem
under the small group test, but both are very significant problems
under the sectorial test, and both are even more severe under the
general community test. To simplify the discussion, we will give a
common name to both: the strategic action problem.
The Chilling Effect. While the small group test would
eliminate the theoretical problem outlined in subpart A and the
problem of strategic action, Anglo-American courts do not allow
actions for defamation based upon reputational harm in very
small segments of society.298 Under American law, the sector
297. Cf. Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and
unworkable to require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a
heterogeneous audience, to consider each small enclave within various
communities whenever it writes about a person.”).
298. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (applying the
substantial and respectable minority test); Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., 907
F. Supp. 766, 778 (D. Vt. 1993) (“[T]he community may be a substantial

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEFAMATION

2325

must be “a substantial and respectable minority,”299 and may not
be a “single individual or a very small group of persons.”300
A possible explanation for this discrepancy can be found in
the aforementioned case of Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc. In this
case, the court refused to hold the defendant liable for an
allegedly defamatory article in Time magazine, which described
the plaintiff as violating the rules of his religious community.301
The court reasoned that it would be unfair and unworkable to
expect a national magazine with a heterogeneous audience to
consider “each small enclave within various communities
whenever it writes about a person.”302 In economic terms,
imposing liability in this case would create high publication costs,
which would require the publisher to devote a significant amount
of resources to ensuring that its reporting would not be
considered offensive in any small community.303 In addition,
these increased costs would likely lead to a chilling effect by
reducing and decreasing the quantity and quality of published
material.304 The cost of precaution—the resources devoted to
respectable group, even though only a minority of the total community.”); Tolley
v. J.S. Fry & Sons, Ltd., [1930] 1 K.B. 467, 479 (C.A.) (Eng.) (applying the
general community test), rev’d, [1931] A.C. 333 (H.L.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977) (“It is enough that the communication would tend
to prejudice him in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority . . . .”).
299. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
300. Id.
301. Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 784–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986).
302. Id. at 785.
303. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[A] rule of
strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a
comparable ‘self-censorship.’”); Weiner v. Time & Life Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784,
785 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and unworkable to require
Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a heterogeneous audience, to
consider each small enclave within various communities whenever it writes
about a person.”).
304. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press. . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376 at 279 (“A rule compelling
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determining whether a statement is defamatory—and the chilling
effect are interrelated, but distinct. Nevertheless, because they
exist within close proximity—one is a problem when the other is a
problem—we will simplify the discussion by referring to them
collectively as the “chilling effect.” We believe that any loss in
accuracy will be made up for by an increase in clarity.
Generally, as the minimal size of the allowable group
becomes smaller, the chilling effect is exacerbated.305 The cost of
determining whether a statement is defamatory in the eyes of the
general community is relatively low; individuals can be presumed
to be familiar with the community as a whole.306 We may expect
that it is somewhat more costly to determine whether a
statement is defamatory in the eyes of a substantial and
reasonable minority. Individuals often have some degree of
familiarity with the larger subgroups in the population, but less
than they do with the community as a whole. It is much more
costly to determine whether a statement is defamatory in the
eyes of a small group. An individual will be familiar with the
prevailing perceptions in small groups only if he or she has
learned about them from personal interaction with members of
these groups or with the potential plaintiff, or through
coincidental exposure to relevant information.
England versus the United States. Having elucidated the
economic factors relevant when choosing between the various
rules, we seek to understand this central question: how can we
account for the divergence among the common law countries?
Why did England adopt the general community test?307 Why is
the sectorial test popular in the United States? In both countries,
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions . . . leads to . . . ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth,
with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false
speech will be deterred.”).
305. Cf. Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and
unworkable to require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a
heterogeneous audience, to consider each small enclave within various
communities whenever it writes about a person.”).
306. See Baker, supra note 20, at 8 (suggesting that the general community
test relies upon standards that are common to society generally).
307. See supra Part II.A (discussing the English adoption of the general
community test).
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common law judges faced a tradeoff between the problem of
strategic action, on the one hand, and the chilling effect, on the
other. The English general community test suffers from a severe
strategic action problem, but a very mild chilling effect, while
under the American sectorial test, both the chilling effect and the
strategic action problem are moderate.308 What explains this
difference? Were English courts more concerned with the chilling
effect than American courts? Were American courts more
concerned with the strategic action problem than English courts?
Or was it a combination of these two factors?
We suspect that the first explanation is more likely. The
extent of the chilling effect depends on how likely individuals are
to know about smaller groups. Because England once had a very
homogeneous population,309 it is possible that the chilling effect
which would come from the adoption of the sectorial test would
have been quite severe. On the other hand, the United States
population had already become relatively diverse by the time that
American courts adopted the sectorial test.310 We do not have any
reason to believe that the strategic action problem would have
been more significant in the United States than in England.
There is no evidence that Americans are more likely to want to
harm their rivals or are more likely to have the skills necessary
to do so through defamatory speech.
As a result, while it would have been costly—in terms of the
chilling effect—to adopt the sectorial test, this cost would have
been much smaller in the United States than in England. The
benefits—in terms of the strategic action problem—of adopting
the sectorial test would have been similar in both countries. As a
consequence, the sectorial test was relatively more desirable in
the United States, and it seems reasonable that American courts
made this choice.
308. Supra Part III.B.1–2.
309. See Riesman, supra note 91, at 1301 (discussing homogeneity in
England); Burchell, supra note 11, at 183 (explaining that the general
community test fits England, where the population is relatively homogeneous).
310. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART 1, at 22 (1975)
(providing census information delineated by sex, race, residence, age, and
nativity by region between 1790 and 1970).
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Caveats. While our analysis shows that both sets of choices—
that of the English courts to adopt the general community test,
and that of the American courts to adopt the sectorial test—may
have been justifiable at the time in terms of the cost–benefit
tradeoff described, several notes of caution are in order.
First, the theoretical model of community standards suggests
that if the element of defamatoriness is empirically founded—
that is, if the tendency to harm one’s reputation is based on an
actual tendency and is not a legal fiction—then only the
unanimity rule satisfies the basic axioms that we have
identified.311 The unanimity rule is not a practically feasible rule
under either the general community test or the sectorial test,
although it is slightly less feasible under the former.312 Because it
seems clear that the unanimity rule is not used in practice, we
must draw the conclusion that courts are not using a coherent or
consistent method to determine the views of the community. That
there is a flaw in the method used does not mean that it should
necessarily be discarded, as it is possible that whatever courts do
in practice under a particular rule may be preferable from the
perspective of a normative goal such as welfare maximization.
However, it should be understood that both the general
community test and the sectorial test are based on a legal fiction
and cannot represent the community belief in any meaningful
sense.
Second, while we argue that the courts in both countries may
have made the best choice, we are assuming that the courts were
limited to the three possible rules discussed here. In a broader
sense, neither the English general community test nor the
American sectorial test is fully optimal. Both suffer from the
problem of strategic action. However, it is plausible that the
chilling effect which would be created by adopting the small
group test would be worse. In addition, it is important to note
that none of these tests removes the chilling effect entirely.
311. See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that the model of community
standards’ four axioms are only satisfied when “a statement made in a
particular context is defamatory if, and only if, it would tend to lower the
reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of every single individual in the
community”).
312. Supra Part III.A.2.
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C. Constitutionalized Defamation
In the past fifty years, American defamation law has
dramatically changed following a set of Supreme Court decisions
that interpreted the U.S. Constitution to require plaintiffs to
prove additional elements as part of a defamation claim.313 The
most relevant of these cases is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., in
which the Supreme Court held that states may not hold
defendants liable for defamation without a showing of fault.314 We
argue that Gertz should be interpreted as allowing liability only if
the defendant was aware, or had reason to be aware, that the
statement was defamatory. Our argument can be broken into two
parts. First, we argue that the Constitution requires fault with
respect to both the accuracy of the statement and its defamatory
nature.315 Second, we maintain that fault with respect to the
defamatory nature of a statement is primarily a question of
knowledge.316
In general, there are two main interpretations of the fault
requirement that we have found in caselaw and legal literature.
First, the Constitution may require fault with respect only to the
accuracy of the statement.317 In this setting, one must prove that
313. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that
liability for defamation requires fault); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
155 (1967) (“We . . . hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may
also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood . . . , on a showing of highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”);
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (concluding that an
action for defamation cannot be brought by a public official if the false
statements were made without the plaintiff’s knowledge of the falsity or the
plaintiff’s reckless disregard for their truth).
314. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual.”).
315. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1970) (indicating that
liability for defamation requires that the defendant “knows that the statement
is false and that it defames” the plaintiff).
316. See id. (requiring the defendant to know that the statement is both
false and defamatory).
317. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)
(requiring fault only as to the falsity of the statement).
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the defendant failed to act reasonably in determining whether the
statement was true.318 Second, the Constitution may require fault
with respect to both the accuracy of the statement and its
defamatory nature.319 In this case, one must prove that the
defendant failed to act reasonably in determining whether the
statement was both false and harmful.320 A defendant who
reasonably believed that the statement was not defamatory may
be liable under the former interpretation, but not under the
latter.
A third potential interpretation, that the Constitution might
require fault with respect only to the defamatory nature of the
statement, has not taken root. Part of the reason for this is that
the defendant’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity or lack
thereof has been deemed central to the case.321 The defendant in
Gertz claimed to have not known that the statements were
false,322 while it seems to have been uncontroverted that they
were understood to be defamatory. In addition, while there may
be value in the publication of statements which are defamatory
but true,323 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, emphasized
318. See, e.g., id. (“Defamation has . . . five elements: (1) publication;
(2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the
falsity on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a
matter concerning a private person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must
be defamatory.”).
319. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) (“One . . . is
subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and
that it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.”).
320. See id. (requiring that the defendant know that the statements are
false and defamatory, that the defendant acted in reckless disregard, or that the
defendant acted negligently in failing to realize the statements’ falsity and
defamatory nature).
321. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(requiring knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for falsity for defamation of
a public figure).
322. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (“The editor denied
any knowledge of the falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated
that he had relied on the author’s reputation and on his prior experience with
the accuracy and authenticity of the author’s contributions to American
Opinion.”).
323. Cf. Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 16, at 932
[T]here is no civil liability for the publication of a true statement even
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that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact,”324 even if these facts are not defamatory.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has endorsed the second
position, namely that the fault requirement should be understood
with respect to both the falsity and the defamatory nature of the
statement.325 However, this issue is far from settled, as many
jurisdictions seem to follow the first approach.326 We argue that
the Restatement’s position is more tenable for several reasons.
First, Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, held that
States may not impose liability without fault with respect to the
publication of a “defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual,”327 implying that the defamatory nature of the
statement is part of the analysis.
Second, the two questions of whether there is fault with
respect to the falsity and defamatoriness of a statement are not
separable. On the one hand, we expect someone with an inkling
that a statement might harm an individual’s reputation if false to
very carefully check the veracity of the claim. On the other hand,
if a person does not know that a statement, if false, could hurt an
individual’s reputation, then we do not expect that person to
exert nearly as much effort in verifying that the statement is
true.
Third, while the first two interpretations are conceptually
distinct, the practical implications are limited by the fact that
American courts only allow for liability when the statement is
defamatory in the eyes of the general community or a substantial
and respectable minority.328 The larger the size of this group, the
though it is uttered maliciously and injures a person’s reputation. . . .
[A] person has no right to a better reputation than he would have if
all the facts about him were known, and . . . members of the public
have an interest in knowing the truth about others with whom they
may associate.”
(footnote omitted).
324. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
325. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977).
326. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)
(requiring fault with respect to the accuracy of the statement).
327. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1970) (explaining
the substantial and respectable minority standard).
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less likely it is that an individual could reasonably, but
incorrectly, come to the conclusion that a defamatory statement is
nondefamatory. Differences between the interpretations would
only be relevant when dealing with smaller groups that barely fit
into the category of “substantial and respectable.” It is possible
that courts have varied these boundaries to avoid holding
defendants liable when they are perceived to have acted
reasonably. For example, in Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., the court
discussed whether the defendant could be expected to know that
the statement in question was defamatory among highly orthodox
Jews in upper Manhattan in determining whether highly
orthodox Jews in this area comprised a substantial and
respectable minority.329
Furthermore, we maintain that fault with respect to the
defamatory nature of a statement is primarily a question of
knowledge. To show that this must be the case, we return to our
argument that the questions of fault with respect to falsity and
defamatoriness are inseparable. While we expect reasonable
persons to exert some effort in determining whether a statement
is accurate, we do not generally expect reasonable persons to
inquire as to whether a statement is defamatory. There is not
necessarily anything wrong with making a defamatory statement
if that statement is factually true.330 However, the level of effort
that a person should exert to verify the accuracy of a statement
depends on what the person knows about the amount of harm
which could result from a false statement, that is, on whether the
person knows the statement is defamatory.
The fault requirement is important because it largely
counteracts most of the chilling effect. We noted in Part II.B that
the chilling effect has two components.331 First, publishers may
expend too much effort in determining whether a statement is
329. Weiner v. Time & Life, Inc., 507 N.Y.S.2d 784, 784–85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1986).
330. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“[There is] a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.”).
331. Supra Part II.B.
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false and defamatory.332 Second, publishers may publish less as a
result of these increased costs and the damages that may be
imposed for honest mistakes.333 The fault requirement
substantially changes the analysis. Publishers will be liable only
if at fault; thus, they only need to expend reasonable effort in
verifying statements.334 Moreover, under the fault requirement,
publishers that act reasonably will not be required to pay
damages when an honest mistake is made—that is, when a false
defamatory statement is published in spite of their reasonable
efforts.335 This effect of the fault requirement on the chilling effect
is not a mere coincidence, but was the primary intention of the
Supreme Court. Both New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. are justified in terms of their effect on selfcensorship.336
332. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[A] rule of
strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’”);
Weiner, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (“[I]t would be manifestly unfair and unworkable to
require Time, a magazine of nationwide scope with a heterogeneous audience, to
consider each small enclave within various communities whenever it writes
about a person.”).
333. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press. . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (“A rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions . . . leads to . . . ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth,
with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false
speech will be deterred.”).
334. See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008)
(requiring knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity for matters concerning a
public official, or at least negligence for matters concerning a private person).
335. See id. (requiring knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity for
matters concerning a public official, or at least negligence for matters
concerning a private person).
336. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[P]unishment of error runs the risk of
inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of speech and press . . . . [A] rule of strict liability that compels a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
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Thus, as a result of the fault requirement introduced in
Gertz, the analysis of the three rules changes. The small group
test is now preferable to both the sectorial test and the general
community test. First, because the chilling effect has been
negated by the fault requirement, the small group test allows us
to eliminate the problem of strategic action without creating a
significant chilling effect. The American sectorial test and the
English general community test, on the other hand, suffer from a
serious strategic action problem. Second, the small group test is
not subject to the theoretical problem described in Part II.A. In
the present legal reality, the adoption of the small group test—
allowing claims of defamation for statements that would be
considered defamatory in the eyes of small groups or
individuals—could improve both the economic efficiency and the
internal consistency of the law.
IV. Conclusion
This Article provides an answer to the most fundamental
question in defamation law: what should make a particular
statement defamatory? The inquiry involves two steps. In the
interpretive step, the court determines whether the allegedly
defamatory statement was true, and in the evaluative step, the
court determines whether the statement, properly interpreted,
had the tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation. This Article
focuses on the latter. Part III explains that the definition of
defamatoriness in common law jurisdictions is essentially
empirical, and distinguishes between the two leading tests—the
English test and the American test.
Part II.A discusses how English courts have embraced the
general community test, whereby a statement is defamatory if
considered so by the public at large. The traditional English test,
which relies on empirical observations, at least de jure, consists of
a normative constraint. A statement is defamatory if considered
so by the general community, taking into account only the views
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.”).
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of “right thinking” people. Thus, an English court will pay no
heed to a community standard if it does not comply with the
normative threshold.
Part II.B illustrates that American courts have generally
endorsed the sectorial test, whereby a statement is defamatory if
considered so by a substantial and respectable minority. This test
integrates two constraints. On the quantitative level, although a
statement can be defamatory if it prejudices a person in the eyes
of a minority, that minority must be substantial. A single
individual or a very small group of persons with peculiar views
will not suffice. This qualification precludes ex definitio the small
group test. On the qualitative level, a statement may be
defamatory if considered so by a mere minority, provided that it
is a respectable one. Accordingly, the fact that a person’s
reputation may be injured in the eyes of a substantial minority is
insufficient. The court will reject the sectorial standard if it does
not comply with the normative threshold. Part II.C discusses
purely normative tests for defamation for the sake of
completeness, although they are uncommonly used.
Part III conducts two separate economic analyses of the tests
for defamation. In the first analysis, we use a theorem from the
economic field of social choice to study the relationship between
the view of the community and the views of the individuals who
comprise the community. We explain that if the former is derived
from the latter, and the derivation satisfies several normatively
desirable properties, then the derivation must be done according
to the unanimity rule. A statement may be considered
defamatory only when all individuals in the relevant community
consider it so. Because this rule is implausible except in the case
of the small group test, it suggests that both the English general
community test and the American sectorial test lack a solid
theoretical foundation.
In the second analysis, we study the costs and benefits
associated with the various tests. We demonstrate that the
important costs involved are the chilling effect and the problem of
strategic action, and that the American sectorial test may have
constituted a reasonable tradeoff between these concerns. We
then argue that the fault requirement introduced in Gertz should
apply to both the falsity and the defamatory nature of the
statement. Under this interpretation, the fault requirement
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ameliorates the chilling effect. As a result, the American sectorial
test is no longer optimal, and it would be preferable from the
standpoint of economic efficiency to adopt the small group test in
its place.

